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NOTES 
USING JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES TO 
REFRAME RETROACTIVITY FOR SECOND OR 
SUCCESSIVE COLLATERAL CHALLENGES 
Thomas H. Gabay* 
 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentence in federal prison for persons with at least 
three prior “violent felony” convictions who are subsequently convicted of 
being in possession of a firearm.  In Johnson v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down one portion of this statute on the ground that it 
was unconstitutionally vague.  In addition to an enumerated list of “violent 
felonies” that can result in a conviction, this portion included a catchall 
category that defined a violent felony as a crime that “otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 
This Note examines whether federal prisoners, whose convictions and 
sentences under this now-unconstitutional prong of the ACCA were final 
before Johnson, and who have previously petitioned for habeas corpus, may 
again petition in federal court based on Johnson’s holding.  In other words, 
the question, which has become the subject of a widening circuit split and is 
under review by the Supreme Court, is whether Johnson’s new rule about 
the unconstitutionality of the ACCA has been “made retroactive . . . by the 
Supreme Court” to federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief in 
federal court.  This Note addresses this question and the circuit split that 
has emerged on the issue and concludes that Johnson has indeed been 
“made retroactive.”  Finally, this Note offers a modified framework for 
assessing the retroactivity of new rules to second or successive habeas 
petitions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider Abe and Ben, two life-long criminals.1  Abe’s criminal 
playground is Florida, whereas Ben spends his time breaking the law in 
Missouri.  During the course of their respective criminal careers, they are 
each convicted of three “violent felonies,”2 including attempted burglary.  
 
 1. This hypothetical is loosely adapted from the facts of In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 
(11th Cir. 2015), and Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 2. For a definition of “violent felony,” see infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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They are each arrested a fourth time and convicted of being felons in 
possession of a firearm.3  This subjects each to mandatory minimum 
sentences of fifteen years in prison, because they have three prior violent 
felony convictions.4  The federal appellate court affirms their convictions 
and the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari, rendering their convictions 
final.5 
End of story?  Not quite.  During their incarcerations, the Supreme Court 
limits the scope of the statute that characterizes a prior conviction as a 
“violent felony”—the same statute under which Abe and Ben were both 
sentenced.6  Abe and Ben, each with a penchant for jailhouse lawyering, 
decide to collaterally challenge their sentences in federal court7 under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.8  But, their petitions are denied.9 
After several years, the Supreme Court holds unconstitutional the 
provision under which Abe and Ben were sentenced; a prior conviction of 
attempted burglary no longer constitutes a violent felony.10  Thus, if Abe 
and Ben had been sentenced now, they would have been sentenced to a 
maximum of ten years, not a minimum of fifteen.11  They both petition again 
under § 2255 to challenge their sentences.12  Ben is successful but Abe is 
not.  Because this is their second time filing § 2255 motions, the procedural 
threshold they must overcome is much more burdensome than the first 
instance threshold.13  The federal jurisdiction in which Ben is incarcerated 
finds that Ben has met this threshold but the jurisdiction in which Abe finds 
 
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (rendering it unlawful for a felon to be in possession 
of a firearm); infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (codifying the Armed Career Criminal Act); infra Part I.A. 
 5. A conviction and sentence are considered final when the defendant has completed a 
direct appeal and petitioned to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Lyn S. 
Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm:  A 
Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 
N.M. L. REV. 161, 169–70 (2005). 
 6. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (holding that failure 
to report to a penal institution is not a violent felony); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 
148 (2008) (holding that driving under the influence is not a violent felony). 
 7. A collateral challenge—also known as a collateral attack or collateral motion—is 
one that occurs after a judgment becomes final. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs 
and Federal Common Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 n.1 
(2002) (“Collateral review refers to review subsequent to direct appeal . . . .”). 
 8. Entitled “Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence,” § 2255 codifies 
the writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners and provides a collateral mechanism for 
challenging a sentence, called a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); infra Part I.C. 
 9. A petition under § 2255 may be denied for various reasons unrelated to the merits of 
the claim, including failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(f). 
 10. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) (providing a maximum term of ten years 
imprisonment for violation of § 922(g)). 
 12. This is considered a “second” petition. See infra note 28. 
 13. In the first instance, they must satisfy the requirements of § 2255(f)(3), while in the 
second instance they are subject to § 2255(h)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; infra Part I.C, I.D.2, 
I.D.3. 
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himself determines that Abe has not.14  Had Abe been incarcerated within 
the same jurisdiction as Ben, he too would have obtained relief.15 
Since the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States,16 
such disparate treatment of inmates across jurisdictions has become 
commonplace.17  In Johnson, the Court held that a portion of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act18 (ACCA), known as the “residual clause,”19 was 
unconstitutionally vague.20  The ACCA is a sentencing enhancement statute 
that mandates a fifteen-year minimum sentence in federal prison to persons 
with at least three prior violent felony convictions who are subsequently 
convicted of being in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).21  
The now unconstitutional residual clause was a catchall phrase that 
expanded the definition of violent felony beyond an enumerated list also to 
encompass crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least one 
year that involve “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”22  Johnson held that “[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision 
to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with 
the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”23 
The Johnson decision has already had significant implications for various 
areas of the law.24  But perhaps most important is the question of to what 
extent inmates previously sentenced under the residual clause, and thereby 
unjustly serving at least five additional years in prison, may use Johnson as 
 
 14. Compare Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 
(authorizing a successive § 2255 petition), with In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 992 (11th Cir. 
2015) (denying a successive § 2255 petition). See also infra Part II. 
 15. See, e.g., Menteer v. United States, 806 F.3d 1156, 1157 (8th Cir. 2015) (authorizing 
a successive § 2255 petition).  Moreover, had this been their first § 2255 motions (i.e., had 
they never previously filed § 2255 motions), they both also likely would have obtained 
relief. See infra note 27 and accompanying text; infra Part II. 
 16. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012); see also infra Part I.A. 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also infra Part I.A. 
 20. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 21. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
 22. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 23. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 24. See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness 
Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2109–13 (2015) (discussing Johnson’s impact on the 
vagueness doctrine); Stephen R. Sady & Gillian R. Schroff, Johnson:  Remembrance of 
Illegal Sentences Past, 28 FED. SENT’G. REP. 58, 60 (2015) (arguing that because the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines define “crime of violence” in a similar manner to the ACCA’s 
definition of “violent felony,” the Guidelines residual clause analogue should also be subject 
to a vagueness challenge under Johnson, and suggesting Johnson may have implications for, 
inter alia, restitution, mandatory life imprisonment, extradition, sex offender registration, 
money laundering, racketeering, restrictions on use of ammunition, and use of minors in 
crimes of violence); Leading Cases, Johnson v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301, 310 
(2015) (“Johnson’s impact may well be broader than the majority admits.”); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts Amendment to 
Definition of “Crime of Violence” in Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Proposes 
Additional Amendments (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/news/press-releases-and-news-
advisories/january-8-2016 (adopting amendment for the portion of the Sentencing 
Guidelines that resembles the residual clause) [perma.cc/ZZU7-XUEA]. 
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a basis for resentencing or release.25  Indeed, in the wake of Johnson, some 
inmates previously sentenced under the residual clause have been able to 
obtain relief by using the Johnson ruling as the basis of a direct appeal26 or 
as the basis of an initial petition under § 2255.27  By contrast, inmates 
petitioning under § 2255 for at least a second time28 have not been 
uniformly granted relief, resulting in a circuit split on whether the rule 
announced in Johnson can be used as the basis of a new motion under 
§ 2255.29 
The key inquiry that the courts have splintered on is whether the new rule 
in Johnson—that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague—has been 
“made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”30  
 
 25. Although no definitive figure exists, it is estimated that approximately 6000 
prisoners have been sentenced under the ACCA. See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact:  
Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 56 (2015); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS:  
FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Felon_in_Possession_FY14.pdf (last visited Feb. 
26, 2015) (noting that 10 percent of the 5498 individuals convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g) in 2014 were sentenced under the ACCA) [perma.cc/N7A5-MSJM].  While it is 
also unknown how many offenders have been sentenced under the residual clause 
specifically, there are potentially hundreds. See Douglas Berman, How Many Federal 
Prisoners Have “Strong Johnson Claims” (and How Many Lawyers Will Help Figure This 
Out)?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 26, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/how-many-federal-prisoners-have-strong-johnson-
claims-and-how-many-lawyers-will-help-figure-this-out.html [perma.cc/8L2C-XHHJ]. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Abbott, No. 14-4764, 2015 WL 7888162, at *1 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 4, 2015) (per curiam) (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing on direct 
appeal in light of Johnson); United States v. Munoz-Navarro, 803 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 
2015) (same); United States v. Clark, 619 F. App’x 512, 512 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 
(same); United States v. Langston, 800 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (same, 
but after remand from the Supreme Court in light of Johnson); United States v. Dixon, 805 
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Snyder, 793 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015) (same). 
 27. See Leah Litman, Circuit Splits & Original Writs, CASETEXT (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://casetext.com/posts/circuit-splits-original-writs [http://perma.cc/S96H-6EDL]. But see 
Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-CV-00152 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2015) (denying an initial 
petition based on Johnson error in light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In re Williams), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 15-7426 (Dec. 11, 2015).  Both Harrimon and Williams, however, 
are outliers. See Litman, supra; infra Part II.B.3. 
 28. Anything other than an inmate’s initial attempt at a collateral challenge under § 2255 
is more precisely referred to as a “second or successive” petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) 
(2012); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of 
Innocence:  A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide 
Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 75, 88 (2005).  In the interest of concision, this Note refers to motions other than a first 
motion under § 2255 simply as “successive.” 
 29. As of this writing, the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
authorized successive § 2255 motions based on Johnson, while the Fifth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have denied authorization. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text; 
see also infra Part II.  This Note refers to petitions for habeas relief founded upon the 
Johnson ruling as petitions alleging “Johnson error” or “Johnson claims.” Cf. Leah Litman, 
Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 45 (2015) 
(characterizing § 2255 motions founded on Johnson as “Johnson claims”). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 2255(h)(2).  Whether a rule has been “made retroactive 
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” is a prerequisite finding that a court of 
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While in Teague v. Lane31 the Court described its foundational approach to 
retroactivity, in Tyler v. Cain32 the Supreme Court specifically articulated 
the standard by which a court determines whether a rule has been “made 
retroactive” by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review.33  This 
inquiry is distinct from determining whether a new rule is simply 
“retroactive” under the Court’s general retroactivity doctrine as detailed in 
Teague.34  The Tyler standard for assessing whether a rule has been made 
retroactive has been criticized as an onerous one,35 and its inconsistent 
application lies at the heart of the current circuit split. 
Although scholars have extensively covered the evolution of the ACCA’s 
tortured residual clause,36 few have yet to examine thoroughly the circuit 
split on Johnson retroactivity while concurrently revisiting the Court’s 
precedent on the retroactivity of new rules to successive petitions for writs 
of habeas corpus.37  Accordingly, this Note examines the circuit split, 
revisits the standard outlined in Tyler, and concludes that Johnson has in 
fact been “made retroactive” and should thus uniformly be given retroactive 
effect to successive § 2255 motions.  In doing so, this Note suggests a 
resolution to the circuit split and proposes a modified approach toward 
determining retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. 
While the Court has recently granted certiorari on the Johnson 
retroactivity question and will likely decide it this term38—a fortunate 
 
appeals must make for a successive motion under § 2255 to be authorized. See id. 
§ 2244(b)(2)(A); infra Part I.C. 
 31. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 32. 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
 33. See id. at 663 (“[A] new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ 
[by the Supreme Court] unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.”). 
 34. See infra Part I.D.2–3.  Indeed, this Note specifically addresses the difficulty in 
applying the phrasing “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court” in accordance with the 
standard articulated in Tyler. 
 35. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 (“The Supreme Court implied, in Tyler v. Cain, 
that a more stringent [retroactivity] standard applies due to the statutory language in 
§ 2255.”); infra Part I.D.4. 
 36. See, e.g., Douglas J. Bench, Jr., Collateral Review of Career Offender Sentences:  
The Case for Coram Nobis, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 155 (2011); David C. Holman, Violent 
Crimes and Known Associates:  The Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 
CONN. L. REV. 209 (2010); James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:  Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537 
(2009); Hayley A. Montgomery, Note, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Ailing 
Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715 (2010); Jonathan Robe, Note, Violently 
Possessed:  Johnson As the Vehicle for Limiting Sentencing Enhancement Under the Armed 
Career Criminals Act, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 105 (2015); Brett T. 
Runyon, Comment, ACCA Residual Clause:  Strike Four?  The Court’s Missed Opportunity 
to Create a Workable Residual Clause Violent Felony Test, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 447 (2012). 
 37. While limited, there has been excellent coverage. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 25; 
Litman, supra note 27; Litman, supra note 29; Low & Johnson, supra note 24; Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Using the Supreme Court’s Original Habeas Jurisdiction to “Ma[k]e” New Rules 
Retroactive (Dec. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2698351 
[https://perma.cc/5TXE-LH7V]; Sady & Schroff, supra note 24. 
 38. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (granting certiorari); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 8, Welch, 136 S. Ct. 790 (No. 15-6418) (“Petitioner asks this Court to 
address the question of [Johnson] retroactivity as it applies to cases on collateral review.”).  
Although not discussed at length herein, the avenue by which the Johnson retroactivity 
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development as the one-year statute of limitations under § 2255 for Johnson 
claims is nearing expiration39—this Note respectfully calls on the Court to 
find not just that Johnson is retroactive under general retroactivity doctrine, 
but also that it has previously been made retroactive.  Doing so would allow 
the Court simultaneously to cause meritorious Johnson claims to be 
reviewed and to remedy the Court’s overall approach toward retroactivity 
for successive collateral challenges.40 
Accordingly, Part I of this Note provides an overview of the relevant 
legal background, including the ACCA, Johnson, habeas corpus, and the 
retroactivity doctrine.  Part II addresses the circuit split on Johnson’s 
retroactive application to successive motions under § 2255.  Part III posits 
that Johnson has been made retroactive and discusses how a Supreme Court 
holding stating that it has been made retroactive will allow the Court to 
reframe its problematic approach toward retroactivity for successive 
collateral challenges.  In particular, Part III argues that Johnson has been 
made retroactive by the Court because, to quote from key Supreme Court 
precedent, the rule “narrow[ed] the scope of a criminal statute by 
interpreting its terms.”41  Part III also proposes a modified framework that 
the Supreme Court might consider adopting to determine whether a new 
rule has been made retroactive.42  This regime entails a liberal reading of 
 
question has made it to the Supreme Court is also an intricate issue because denials of 
authorizations to file successive collateral challenges are not reviewable via certiorari. See 
infra note 94 and accompanying text. See generally Vladeck, supra note 37; Steve Vladeck, 
Vehicle Problems Vs. Unusual Vehicles:  The Supreme Court’s Bizarre Cert. Grant in 
Welch, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 8, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2016/01/vehicle-problems-vs-unusual-vehicles-the-supreme-courts-bizarre-cert-grant-in-
welch.html (discussing the unusual procedural posture of Welch) [perma.cc/9HPF-X3FZ]. 
 39. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 40. See infra Part III.  Although this Note calls on the Court to find that Johnson was 
“made retroactive” in the pending Welch case, and a holding in Welch stating that Johnson is 
retroactive would reconcile the circuit split, this Note recognizes that the case could also 
theoretically—and unfortunately—leave unresolved the question of whether Johnson had 
already been “made retroactive.”  The petitioner in Welch is contesting the denial of a 
certificate of appealability, after a dismissal of an initial § 2255 motion. See Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 38, at 4.  The Court could therefore feasibly hold Johnson 
retroactive, but not address, nor need to address, whether Johnson has been “made 
retroactive.” Cf. Vladeck, supra note 37, at 5–6 (discussing Harrimon v. United States, a 
pending petition for certiorari before judgment petition on a denial of a first Johnson-based 
§ 2255 motion that, if granted, could make Johnson retroactive but still leave open the 
question of whether it was “made retroactive”).  For discussions of the other ways in which 
the Court could have specifically addressed the “made retroactive” question, see, e.g., Leah 
M. Litman, The Exceptional Circumstances of Johnson v. United States, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 81, 85–86 (2016) (arguing the Court should grant a petition for an 
original writ of habeas corpus or a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment); Vladeck, 
supra note 37 (arguing that the Court should consider the issue in an original writ of habeas 
corpus); Steve Vladeck, Is the Solicitor General Playing a Shell Game with the Supreme 
Court Over Johnson Retroactivity?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 16, 2015, 5:33 PM),  
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12/is-the-solicitor-general-playing-a-shell-
game-with-the-supreme-court-over-johnson-retroactivity.html (recognizing several currently 
pending Supreme Court petitions for “extraordinary writs”) [perma.cc/F4BK-D9KP]. 
 41. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (citing Bousley v. United States, 
523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998)). 
 42. See infra Part III.B. 
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Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Tyler and results in the general 
retroactivity inquiry as described in Teague as the sole test for determining 
whether a rule has been made retroactive.43  Finally, Part III concludes by 
discussing the policy benefits that would result were the Court to hold that 
Johnson has been made retroactive.44 
I.  THE ACCA, JOHNSON, HABEAS CORPUS, 
AND THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE COLLIDE 
This part provides the legal background necessary to understand the 
circuit split on Johnson retroactivity.  Part I.A discusses the ACCA’s 
mandatory minimum sentence and the residual clause.  Part I.B discusses 
the Johnson decision.  Part I.C discusses habeas corpus.  Finally, Part I.D 
discusses the retroactivity doctrine. 
A.  The ACCA and the Residual Clause 
The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years on 
an offender who (1) is guilty of being in possession of a firearm in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)45 and (2) has been convicted three times for prior 
violent felonies or serious drug offenses.46  Congress passed the ACCA in 
1984, as a part of a larger act, in an effort to curb the number of crimes 
committed by repeat violent crime offenders by severely punishing their 
possession of firearms.47  Congress intended that only prior crimes 
indicating that a felon is especially dangerous when in possession of a 
firearm should qualify.48  In defining “violent felony,” the statute includes 
both an enumerated list of violent felonies and a catchall provision.49  The 
ACCA defines a violent felony as 
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
 
 43. See infra Part III.B. 
 44. See infra Part III.C.  While the change to retroactivity analysis proposed herein 
could also be realized through an amendment to § 2255, that avenue is beyond this Note’s 
scope.  For a discussion on legislative solutions, see Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of 
Fear and Death:  Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 699, 774–76 (2002). 
 45. Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a felon to “possess . . . any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).  
Without the ACCA’s enhancement, violation of § 922(g) carries a ten-year maximum 
sentence. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 46. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
 47. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661.  
Congress passed the ACCA in 1984 and in 1986 amended it to its current form. See 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. XVIII, 98 Stat. 1837, 
2185 (1984); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1401–1402, 100 Stat. 3207 
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)); see also Holman, supra note 36, 
at 211 n.1. 
 48. See Montgomery, supra note 36, at 717. 
 49. See id. at 717–18. 
2016] REFRAMING RETROACTIVITY UNDER JOHNSON 1619 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.50 
The emphasized portion of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the unconstitutional portion 
known as the “residual clause.”51 
B.  Johnson v. United States Holds the Residual Clause 
Void-for-Vagueness 
In 2010, Samuel Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of 
a firearm in violation of § 922(g).52  In light of Johnson’s extensive 
criminal record, the Government requested an enhanced sentence under the 
ACCA,53 arguing that “three of Johnson’s previous offenses—including 
unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun . . . qualified as violent 
felonies.”54  The district court agreed with the Government and sentenced 
Johnson under the ACCA to the mandatory minimum fifteen years in 
prison.55 
While Johnson’s other predicate offenses were listed in the statute, his 
prior offense of possession of a short-barreled shotgun was not; it fell under 
the residual clause.56  After Johnson unsuccessfully appealed his sentence 
to the Eighth Circuit,57 the Supreme Court granted certiorari (on direct 
appeal) to decide whether unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun 
qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA58 and 
later requested reargument addressing the residual clause’s compatibility 
with the “Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws.”59 
 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 51. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).  In the interest of 
completeness, this Note recognizes that a new bill, if passed, will reduce the ACCA’s 
mandatory minimum sentence from fifteen years to ten years.  This would create an 
overlapping sentencing range and be applicable retroactively, thus potentially rendering the 
circuit split on Johnson retroactivity moot. See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 
2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).  This Note, however, analyzes the circuit split as is, 
because while such legislation would be a welcome reform to the federal sentencing 
structure, it would not address the problematic holding in Tyler. 
 52. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See United States v. Johnson, 526 F. App’x 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
 58. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 59. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”).  The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).  Moreover, 
“The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement, 
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law,’ and a statute 
that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due process.’  These principles apply . . . to 
statutes fixing sentences.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) and citing United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). 
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A six-justice majority held that the residual clause was void-for-
vagueness.60  Recognizing that the residual clause had “‘created numerous 
splits among the lower federal courts,’ where it has proved ‘nearly 
impossible to apply consistently,’”61 the Court held that it was so vague that 
applying an increased sentence under it violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.62  The Court reasoned that two facets of the clause 
created “a black hole of confusion and uncertainty”63 and rendered it 
unconstitutionally vague.64  First, the residual clause fostered uncertainty 
about how to evaluate the risk a crime carried.65  In applying the residual 
clause, judges estimated the level of risk using the “judicially imagined 
‘ordinary case’ of a crime,” and not “real-world facts or statutory 
elements.”66  Accordingly, the Court was unable to articulate a viable 
method for assessing which kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime 
entailed.67  Second, the residual clause presented uncertainty as to how 
much risk the ordinary case had to pose to be considered a violent felony.68  
Therefore, by “combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the 
crime to qualify as a violent felony,” the Court held that “the residual clause 
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 
Clause tolerates.”69  The Court ultimately granted Johnson relief and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.70  Although Johnson’s 
successful challenge was on direct appeal of his ACCA conviction, the 
Supreme Court’s holding opened the door to potential federal habeas corpus 
petitions under § 2255 by prisoners previously sentenced under the residual 
clause. 
C.  28 U.S.C. § 2255 Provides a Habeas Corpus 
Mechanism for Federal Inmates 
When the Supreme Court issues a new ruling rendering a criminal statute 
unconstitutional, defendants convicted of a crime under the now-
unconstitutional statute have several options for utilizing the new ruling as a 
potential route to a remedy.  For recently convicted prisoners, a direct 
 
 60. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.  Although the residual clause has been deemed 
unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute remains in force. See id. 
 61. Id. at 2560 (quoting Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (2009) (Alito, J., 
concurring)).  Indeed, Johnson was the fifth Supreme Court case to address the residual 
clause. See id. at 2559. 
 62. See id. at 2563. 
 63. Id. at 2562 (quoting United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee, 
J., concurring)). 
 64. See id. at 2557. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2558. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 2563. 
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appeal71 is the procedural path to judicial relief, whether release or a new 
trial.72  Inmates who have already lost on direct appeal may instead seek 
postconviction relief by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum.73 
Habeas corpus, Latin for “that you have the body”74 and known as the 
Great Writ,75 is a centuries-old means for contesting the lawfulness of 
detention.76  Habeas corpus is a “collateral” way for a prisoner to challenge 
a sentence—meaning without directly challenging substantive guilt of the 
offense charge.77  Although of common law origin, the writ of habeas 
corpus is presently codified in several places in the U.S. Code.78  The 
general provision is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which grants the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus.79  For 
prisoners convicted of federal crimes, the more typically utilized § 2255 
allows federal prisoners to collaterally challenge a sentence in federal 
court.80  Section 2255 provides in pertinent part: 
 
 71. A direct appeal involves appealing the conviction and sentence to the relevant court 
of appeals and petitioning for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291, 1254 (2012).  Afterward, a sentence is deemed final. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 
169–70. 
 72. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 73. See A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
 74. See Habeas corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 75. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 78. 
 76. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210 (1952) (“[The] [p]ower to issue the 
writ of habeas corpus, ‘the most celebrated writ in the English law,’ was granted to the 
federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *129)). 
 77. See Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 401 (1924); supra note 7; see also Desist v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[Habeas corpus] seeks to assure 
that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large 
risk that the innocent will be convicted.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1245 (6th ed. 2009) (noting 
that “habeas lies when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction—and that jurisdiction is 
lacking when the statute under which the defendant was convicted is unconstitutional”).  For 
further discussion of the Great Writ, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:  FROM 
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010). 
 78. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (2012).  The Great Writ is also enshrined in the 
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended . . . .”).  For a discussion of the Suspension Clause, see generally Tor 
Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus:  Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United 
States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475 (2005). 
 79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence:  Courts, 
Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 94 (2012). 
 80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Bench, supra note 36, at 172.  Section 2255 provides an 
identical remedy to the common law writ of habeas corpus. See Hill v. United States, 368 
U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (noting that § 2255 was enacted to provide “a remedy exactly 
commensurate” with habeas corpus relief).  Although not of primary relevance to this Note, 
§ 2254 is the state analogue to § 2255 and allows state prisoners to collaterally challenge 
their sentences in federal court. See Brandon L. Garrett, Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 499, 524 (2014).  In fact, the vast majority of federal habeas petitions are filed under 
§ 2254 by prisoners convicted of state crimes. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER 
PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000 (2002), 
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A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of 
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States . . . or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move 
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence.81 
Simply stated, § 2255 allows for an inmate to collaterally challenge82 a 
sentence that was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.83 
Nearly fifty years after the enactment of § 2255, Congress promulgated 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199684 (AEDPA), 
which amended § 2255 and established several statutory constraints.85  
Relevant for present purposes, AEDPA amended § 2255 to include a one-
year statute of limitations on an inmate’s claim,86 which, in the case of 
inmates seeking to rely on a new rule as the basis of a claim, “run[s] 
from . . . the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the 
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”87  
 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf (finding that 80 percent of federal habeas 
petitions filed in 2000 were from state inmates) [perma.cc/ZR4W-S7ZL]. 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).  While a motion for resentencing or release under § 2255 
provides the predominant collateral mechanism for a federal prisoner seeking postconviction 
relief, there are other avenues a federal prisoner could pursue—which themselves carry 
procedural hurdles—such as a petition under § 2241. See Bench, supra note 36, at 175; 
supra note 79 and accompanying text.  Although rare, a federal prisoner may also seek an 
“extraordinary writ” from the Supreme Court, such as an original writ of habeas corpus or an 
original writ of mandamus. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996); Litman, supra 
note 27; Stevenson, supra note 44, at 756–57; Vladeck, supra note 37, at 7–9.  While these 
mechanisms are not addressed here, they are additional ways the question of whether 
Johnson was made retroactive can be heard by the Supreme Court. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. For ease of exposition, this Note refers to § 2255 motions, habeas petitions, 
collateral challenges, and variations thereof interchangeably. 
 83. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 1303, 1307.  Although a simplified explanation 
of claims cognizable under § 2255, it is sufficient for the purposes of this Note, as Johnson 
claims are widely regarded as constitutional. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47; see also infra 
Part II.  Nevertheless, other claims of sentencing error, including nonconstitutional error, 
may be cognizable under § 2255 if the alleged error involves “a fundamental defect which 
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 
178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); see also Russell, 
supra note 79, at 96, 105–06. 
 84. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 85. See Garrett, supra note 80, at 524; Russell, supra note 79, at 96–97. 
 86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).  This statute of limitations was a departure from traditional 
habeas doctrine, which recognized no limitations period. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 
1414. 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (emphasis added).  For inmates seeking to allege Johnson 
error, the limitations period began on June 26, 2015, and will expire in June 2016.  This Note 
only considers the retroactivity problem for timely filed successive § 2255 motions alleging 
Johnson error.  There are ways, however, for an untimely motion still to obtain review, 
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In effect, under § 2255 an inmate can only assert a claim anchored upon a 
new Supreme Court ruling within one year of that ruling, so long as that 
ruling is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.88 
In addition to the one-year statute of limitations, AEDPA established 
several “gatekeeping” restrictions on successive § 2255 petitions.89  As 
relevant here, AEDPA imposed § 2255(h)(2), which mandates that before 
an inmate relying on a new rule of constitutional law may move for a 
successive time under § 2255, the motion “must be certified as provided in 
section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain . . . a 
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”90  Section 
2244, in turn, provides that the movant must first petition to the circuit court 
in the jurisdiction where he or she was sentenced for an order authorizing 
the district court to consider the successive motion.91  The circuit court may 
only authorize the motion if it determines that the petitioner made a prima 
facie showing that the new rule was made retroactive by the Supreme Court 
per the requirements of § 2255(h)(2).92  If such showing is made, only then 
will the inmate have leave to file a successive § 2255 motion with the 
district court.93  Finally, the grant or denial of an authorization “shall not be 
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a 
writ of certiorari.”94 
 
including equitable tolling in situations involving a fundamental miscarriage of justice or 
actual innocence. See Litman, supra note 40, at 87. 
 88. See infra Part I.D (discussing AEDPA’s interaction with the Court’s retroactivity 
doctrine).  An additional hurdle is procedural default.  Briefly, if an inmate could have, but 
failed to raise a claim on direct appeal, the doctrine of procedural default prevents the inmate 
from raising that claim on collateral review. See Litman, supra note 27.  Although Johnson 
was not previously available to petitioners now seeking relief for Johnson error, a petitioner 
would still have to establish cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim previously. See 
id.  Nevertheless, the Government has been waiving such procedural arguments on defaulted 
Johnson claims. See id. 
 89. See Vladeck, supra note 37, at 1; Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90. 
 90. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis added).  Note that the emphasized language is 
similar, although not identical, to the retroactivity language in § 2255(f)(3). See supra note 
87 and accompanying text.  This nuanced difference is of central importance to this Note. 
 91. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244.  Section 2244 also governs the requirements for successive 
petitions by state inmates under § 2254. See id. 
 92. See id.  A prima facie showing requires a showing of potential merit sufficient to 
“warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.” In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 432–33 (6th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also In re 
Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).  Furthermore, the court of 
appeals shall grant or deny the authorization “not later than 30 days after the filing of the 
motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)(D). 
 93. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90 (“Under the certification process of the AEDPA, 
the circuit courts of appeals serve a ‘gatekeeping’ function, and keep the courthouse doors 
closed unless an individual meets the narrow criteria of new evidence or new constitutional 
law entitling one to a second or successive motion. . . .  [I]ts function is to prevent a hearing 
on the merits.”). 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)(E). 
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These austere retroactivity provisions95 significantly limit the availability 
of collateral relief even on a colorable claim of a new rule, especially on a 
successive collateral challenge.96  Before examining how the Supreme 
Court has most recently interpreted these retroactivity requirements, this 
Note turns to a discussion of the retroactivity doctrine generally. 
D.  The Retroactivity Doctrine Dictates Whether New Rules 
May Be Applied to Habeas Corpus Petitions 
The retroactivity doctrine is instrumental in determining whether a court 
will review an initial or successive § 2255 motion, assuming the motions 
are anchored on a new rule of constitutional law made by the Supreme 
Court.97  Current retroactivity doctrine dictates that newly decided rules of 
constitutional law should not, save for certain exceptions, be available to 
defendants whose convictions have become final prior to the new rule’s 
announcement.98  The retroactivity doctrine—along with AEDPA—is 
consequently a substantial barrier to federal habeas petitions.99 
This section begins by providing a brief discussion of the early 
retroactivity doctrine in Part I.D.1, before examining the modern Teague 
approach in Part I.D.2.  Part I.D.3 then addresses the Court’s Tyler decision 
on retroactivity for successive collateral attacks.  This section ends with a 
discussion of the criticisms of Tyler in Part I.D.4. 
 
 95. See Jason M. Zarrow & William H. Milliken, The Retroactivity of Substantive Rules 
to Cases on Collateral Review and the AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Alabama, 
48 IND. L. REV. 931, 984 (2015) (discussing the AEDPA provisions that implicate 
retroactivity). 
 96. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90–91 (“[E]ven if the prisoner has a meritorious 
claim, if he cannot survive the certification process, the federal court cannot hear his 
claim . . . and cannot grant appropriate relief. . . .  AEDPA not only restricts the remedies 
available to prisoners, but also limits the power of federal courts.”); Ronn Gehring, Tyler v. 
Cain:  A Fork in the Path for Habeas Corpus or the End of the Road for Collateral Review?, 
36 AKRON L. REV. 181, 205 (2002) (“[T]he gatekeeper provision of section 2244(b) is 
perhaps the most challenging obstacle inmates must overcome to have a court grant a second 
or successive petition.”).  Consequently, AEDPA has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., John 
H. Blume, AEDPA:  The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 289 (2006) 
(arguing AEDPA’s statute of limitations “has deprived thousands of potential habeas 
petitioners of any federal review of their convictions”); Stevenson, supra note 44, at 735 
(examining AEDPA’s virtual foreclosure on certain constitutional claims that are sometimes 
unreviewable until the successive petition stage). 
 97. A case announces a new rule “if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at 
the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 
1107 (2013) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).  Whether a case presents a 
new rule is itself a hot-button issue, but one that is beyond the scope of this Note. See 
generally Bryant, supra note 73. 
 98. See Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure:  The 
Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. 21, 27 (2014); 
see also Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 932. 
 99. See Benjamin Robert Ogletree, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Chapter 154:  The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 603, 673 (1998).  Although this Note is solely concerned with the retroactivity of 
new criminal rules, retroactivity doctrine is also implicated in the civil context. See generally 
Pamala J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine:  Equality, Reliance, and Stare Decisis, 
48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515 (1998). 
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1.  The Early Retroactivity Doctrine 
Traditionally, new rules applied without distinction to cases on both 
direct and collateral review.100  Under this traditional view of retroactivity, 
judges did not create new law, but rather discovered and applied preexisting 
law.101  Accordingly, the idea that a particular rule of law did not apply 
across the board to all cases was anathema.102  But this view severely 
constrained the capacity for the Supreme Court to recognize revolutionary 
new rules, especially in the federal constitutional criminal procedure 
context.103  And so it came under attack in the mid-twentieth century during 
the Warren Court era.104 
The Warren Court’s doctrinal solution was articulated in Linkletter v. 
Walker.105  The specific question in Linkletter was whether the new 
exclusionary rule derived from Mapp v. Ohio106 should apply to state 
criminal cases on federal collateral review.107  The Court devised a three-
prong balancing test involving an examination of the prior history of the 
rule, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive application would 
advance its operation.108  This case-by-case approach was theoretically 
useful because it enabled the Court to continue expanding criminal 
defendants’ rights without the danger of a flood of habeas petitions from 
previously sentenced defendants, as there was then no statute of limitations 
on habeas petitions.109  The functional result of the Linkletter standard, 
however, was disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals and 
arbitrary retroactive application of new rules.110  Consequently, many 
 
 100. See Kendall Turner, Note, A New Approach to the Teague Doctrine, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 1159, 1163 (2014).  The retroactivity doctrine is also implicated in the Constitution. 
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); see also 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (defining ex post facto laws).  The prohibition against 
ex post facto laws is primarily concerned with barring the retroactive application of new 
criminal laws to criminalize previously lawful conduct. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.  This is 
distinct from the retroactivity issue discussed herein. 
 101. See Matthew R. Doherty, Note, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity:  The 
Retroactive Application of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 445, 450–51 (2004). 
 102. See id. at 451. 
 103. See Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 105, 113 (2010) (“[I]t became increasingly likely that any given state prisoner could 
point to some federal procedural right . . . that was violated during that prisoner’s trial.  
Thus, an unbridled application of the general retroactivity principle could truly have resulted 
in the states being required to throw open their prison doors.”). 
 104. See Turner, supra note 100, at 1163–64. 
 105. 381 U.S. 618 (1965); see also Bryant, supra note 73, at 30. 
 106. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 107. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619–20. 
 108. See Gehring, supra note 96, at 187.  Incidentally, the Linkletter Court held that Mapp 
was not retroactive. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 620. 
 109. See Allen, supra note 103, at 114. 
 110. See id. (“As between petitioners, the Linkletter approach was in effect a 
lottery . . . .”). 
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judges and legal scholars, led by Justice Harlan, criticized the Linkletter 
approach to retroactivity.111 
2.  Teague v. Lane Provides the Modern Framework 
for the Retroactivity Doctrine 
The Linkletter years ended in 1989 with the Court’s decision in 
Teague,112 in which Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality, largely 
adopted Justice Harlan’s proffered solution to the retroactivity puzzle.113  In 
Teague, the Court recognized the inherent problems with Linkletter114 and 
determined that its approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review 
“require[d] modification.”115  Following Justice Harlan, the Court held that 
new constitutional rules are always applicable to all cases on direct appeal 
and generally not retroactive to cases on collateral review.116  The Court 
emphasized the interest in finality, which it characterized as “essential to 
the operation of our criminal justice system.”117  The Court did, however, 
 
 111. See Doherty, supra note 101, at 453–54; Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword:  The High 
Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57–58 
(1965).  In particular, Justice Harlan grew frustrated with the lack of an established 
dichotomy for cases on direct appeal and collateral review and formulated a new approach to 
retroactivity. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that new rules should be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, 
but generally not to cases on collateral review); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 688–
89, 701 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (same). 
 112. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 184 (“Teague 
v. Lane [is] the pivotal case establishing the modern retroactivity doctrine . . . .”).  While 
Teague and its progeny originated mostly from state prisoners petitioning for federal habeas 
relief, the holdings on retroactivity also apply to petitions from federal prisoners. See 
Christopher S. Strauss, Collateral Damage:  How the Supreme Court’s Retroactivity 
Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. 
REV. 1220, 1240 (2003). See generally Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) 
(discussing Teague in the context of a federal inmate’s habeas motion). 
 113. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305–10, 312; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. 
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
1731, 1746 (1991) (“[In Teague] the Supreme Court accepted the outlines of Justice Harlan’s 
approach to retroactivity on habeas corpus.”). 
 114. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305 (“Linkletter . . . led to unfortunate disparity in the 
treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review.”). 
 115. Id. at 301. 
 116. See id. at 308. 
 117. Id. at 309; see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?  Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146 (1970) (suggesting finality as a reason for 
limited collateral review); Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences 
on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 185 (2014) (“[T]he government 
has a strong interest in preserving . . . a judgment.”).  A related theory for limited 
retroactivity is to prevent a flood of litigation. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
Still, and of particular importance to this Note, some argue that finality and floodgate 
interests are not implicated when a petitioner seeks resentencing as opposed to a 
modification of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 
456 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that “the cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the 
cost of a retrial” because “resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and 
requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and court personnel”); Russell, 
supra note 79, at 82–83 (“Concerns about finality are much less pressing when a court 
reconsiders the length of a sentence rather than the validity of a conviction.”); id. at 135 
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carve out two exceptions to the general presumption of nonretroactivity on 
collateral review:  (1) if the new rule places “certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe,”118 or (2) if the new rule “requires the observance of ‘those 
procedures that . . . are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”119 
The Supreme Court has on several occasions elaborated on Teague’s first 
exception to nonretroactivity.120  The first such elaboration came in Penry 
v. Lynaugh,121 where the Court was faced with deciding whether the 
execution of the mentally handicapped is unconstitutional and, if so, 
whether that decision was retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s claim 
on collateral review.122  The Court held that “the first exception set forth in 
Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal 
punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain 
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or 
offense.”123  While the Court ultimately ruled that executing the mentally 
handicapped was not unconstitutional (at the time),124 its discussion of 
Teague’s first exception remains good law.125 
In Bousley v. United States,126 the Court further expanded its retroactivity 
approach when it determined that Bailey v. United States127 was retroactive 
on collateral review.128  In Bousley, the Court emphasized that the Teague 
 
(arguing that in the career offender sentencing context, the number of resentencings would 
be “contained”). 
 118. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). 
 119. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and 
dissenting in part)).  “Although Teague was a plurality opinion . . . the Teague rule was 
affirmed and applied by a majority of the Court shortly thereafter.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 
552 U.S. 264, 266 n.1 (2008) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989)). 
 120. See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Bousley v. United States, 523 
U.S. 614 (1998); Penry, 492 U.S. 302, abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002); see also Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of 
Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 965–66 (2015) (discussing the 
development of the substantive rule exception to nonretroactivity).  While the first exception 
has been expanded, the second Teague exception—the “watershed” rule exception—has yet 
to be applied to a new rule. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 1246. 
 121. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
 122. See id. at 329. 
 123. Id. at 330. 
 124. Id. at 340.  This point was overruled thirteen years later. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 125. See Allen, supra note 103, at 125 (“Lower courts, both state and federal, have 
unanimously concluded that the Teague discussion in Penry remains in force and that Atkins 
is entitled to retroactive application.”).  Penry also extended Teague’s applicability from 
convictions to sentences. See Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 960.  Nevertheless, the 
Penry approach to the first Teague exception is rarely invoked. See Turner, supra note 100, 
at 1168 (“Penry has proven to be an anomaly, and its approach contrasts starkly with later 
applications of Teague.”). 
 126. 523 U.S. 614 (1998). 
 127. 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (holding the word “uses” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to mean 
active employment of a firearm and not mere possession). 
 128. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621.  In Bousley, the petitioner pleaded guilty to “using” a 
firearm “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.” See id. at 616.  On the 
petitioner’s first § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court considered whether the new rule in 
Bailey should have retroactive effect on the theory that the petitioner’s guilty plea for 
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nonretroactivity rule is only applicable to procedural rules, not “to the 
situation in which th[e] Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute 
enacted by Congress,” which is substantive in nature.129  The Court then 
relied on the doctrinal foundations of habeas corpus to draw an analogy as 
to why substantive rules, similar to certain procedural rules exempt from 
nonretroactivity under Teague, are also entitled to retroactive application.130  
The Court asserted that the Teague exceptions are founded upon a principle 
function of habeas corpus—“to assure that no man has been incarcerated 
under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the 
innocent will be convicted.”131  The Court then asserted that much like the 
Teague exceptions, including “decisions placing conduct ‘beyond 
the . . . law-making authority to proscribe,’”132 decisions holding that a 
federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct are also 
retroactive.133  This is so because their retroactive application similarly 
advances a core principle of habeas corpus—mitigating “a significant risk 
that a defendant stands convicted of an ‘act that the law does not make 
criminal.’”134  The Court therefore determined that “the doctrinal 
underpinnings of habeas review” supported the retroactive application of 
Bailey to the petitioner’s claim.”135  In short, Bousley provides that a 
substantive change in law is retroactive.136 
 
“using” a firearm during a drug trafficking crime was not fully informed and therefore 
unlawful. See id. at 617–18.  Although Bailey did not provide a new rule of constitutional 
law, and hence would not qualify for application to a successive motion under § 2255, this 
was a first § 2255 motion, and that requirement was not implicated. Compare 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h)(2) (2012) (requiring new rules to be constitutional in nature for use on successive 
motions), with id. § 2255(f)(3) (exhibiting no such requirement for using new rules on initial 
motions). 
 129. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620.  The Court essentially combined the two Teague 
exceptions into one:  certain procedural rules, such as those that place certain conduct 
beyond the lawmaking authority to proscribe, and watershed rules of criminal procedure, are 
entitled to retroactive application.  After combining the two Teague exceptions into one, the 
Court simultaneously created an additional species of retroactive rules:  rules that are 
substantive. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 1246. 
 130. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620–21. 
 131. Id. at 620 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989)). 
 132. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). 
 133. See id. at 620–21. 
 134. Id. at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).  By citing 
Davis, the Court invoked an older case that, in addressing whether a certain claim was 
cognizable on collateral review, discussed the core purposes of habeas corpus. See Davis, 
417 U.S. at 346–47 (holding the petitioner’s claim—that he was convicted for an act that the 
law does not make criminal—is cognizable under § 2255 because a core function of habeas 
is to protect against such risks); see also Doherty, supra note 101, at 460 (“The importance 
of the distinction between substance and procedure in the habeas context is rooted in concern 
for the principal function of habeas corpus relief, which is to assure that an innocent person 
will not stay convicted or incarcerated under a law that is no longer criminal.”); supra note 
77 and accompanying text. 
 135. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. 
 136. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 197 (“Bousley appeared to provide that changes in 
substantive law would not be subject to the Teague analysis and, as such, substantive 
decisions would apply to cases pending in habeas review.”); Doherty, supra note 101, at 460 
n.87 (“Bousley stands for the proposition that a change in substantive law must be given 
retroactive affect [sic].”).  At least one scholar, however, points out that the holding of 
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In Schriro v. Summerlin,137 the Court echoed its Bousley approach to the 
Teague doctrine.  In Summerlin, the petitioner collaterally challenged his 
death penalty sentence, arguing that the new rule announced in Ring v. 
Arizona138 rendered his sentence unlawful.139  The Court found that Ring 
was not entitled to retroactive effect because it was not substantive and did 
not meet the Teague exceptions.140  But more importantly, the Court 
reiterated its ruling in Bousley, stating new substantive rules, including 
“decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its 
terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct 
or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish,” 
generally apply retroactively.141  Such rules, the Court emphasized, are 
entitled to retroactive effect “because they ‘necessarily carry a significant 
risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make 
criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”142 
In the days leading up to this Note’s publication, the Supreme Court’s 
retroactivity jurisprudence evolved again with the Court’s decision in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana.143  The Court reemphasized that Teague’s first 
exception stands for the proposition that substantive rules are entitled to 
retroactive effect.144  The Court also stated that Teague requires the 
retroactive application of new substantive rules145 and that “when a new 
substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the 
Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect 
 
Bousley is not so clear. See Litman, supra note 29, at 49 (“[I]t’s not clear whether the 
‘holding’ of Bousley is that all decisions altering the meaning of a criminal statute are 
substantive, or whether the ‘holding’ of Bousley is that all decisions interpreting what 
conduct the law proscribes are substantive.  There is language in the decision to support 
either reading.”). 
 137. 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 138. 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding it unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty). 
 139. See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 350–51. 
 140. See id. at 353, 357–58. 
 141. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).  The Court reiterated that rules placing the 
particular conduct covered by the statute beyond the state’s power to punish, which 
traditionally were considered a Teague exception, are more accurately characterized as 
substantive rules not subject to Teague. See id. at 352 n.4.  Accordingly, like Bousley, at 
least one scholar suggests that Summerlin also “eliminate[d] the first Teague exception and 
recognize[d] simply that changes in substantive law are not subject to Teague at all.” 
Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 209.  Because the substantive rule exception to nonretroactivity 
evolved from Teague’s original first exception, this Note refers to such rules as falling 
within Teague’s “substantive rule exception” or the “first exception,” although substantive 
rules are more precisely not subject to Teague.  For a thorough analysis of the substantive 
rule exception, see Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 952–64. 
 142. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 
(1998)). 
 143. No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (holding that the rule announced 
in Miller v. Alabama—that mandatory imprisonment for life without parole for juvenile 
homicide offenders is unconstitutional—is substantive and thus retroactive to cases on 
collateral review). 
 144. See id. at *5. 
 145. See id. at *6. 
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to that rule.”146  Moreover, the Court provided a general principle:  “[A] 
court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that 
violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence 
became final before the rule was announced.”147 
3.  Tyler v. Cain Controls Retroactivity for 
Successive Collateral Challenges 
The pertinent question now becomes, how does the Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence, as explained by Teague and its progeny, interact with the 
retroactivity requirements imposed by AEDPA?  Recall that a showing of 
retroactivity is necessary for an inmate seeking to rely on a new rule in a 
§ 2255 motion.148  For first § 2255 motions,149 an inmate may only use a 
new rule within a year of its announcement if the new rule was recognized 
by the Supreme Court and retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review.150  Hence, Courts assess both whether the rule is new and whether 
it is retroactive under Teague.151  But despite the fact that § 2255(f)(3) and 
§ 2255(h)(2) exhibit very similar retroactivity language, courts do not 
employ the same approach in determining the retroactivity of a new rule for 
the purposes of successive § 2255 motions.  Under § 2255(h)(2), a 
petitioner may not file a successive motion unless it is predicated on a new 
rule of law that was made retroactive to cases on collateral review “by the 
Supreme Court.”152  Section 2255(h)(2)’s use of the operative phrase “by 
the Supreme Court” has resulted in a distinct inquiry for establishing 
retroactivity for successive § 2255 motions—an inquiry not governed solely 
by Teague, but also by the Court’s decision in Tyler.153 
 
 146. Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at *10. 
 148. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(3), (h)(2) (2012); supra notes 87–93 and accompanying 
text. 
 149. Recall that “first” or “initial” § 2255 motions refer to an inmate’s first attempt at a  
§ 2255 motion, after his or her conviction and sentence have become final. See supra notes 
27–28 and accompanying text. 
 150. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). 
 151. See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (“[I]n addition to performing any 
analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a 
threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised.”); Doherty, supra note 101, at 
465 (“[T]he Teague analysis remains a seminal inquiry in analyzing retroactivity.”); Scott, 
supra note 117, at 190 (“The Supreme Court . . . has consistently applied Teague’s non-
retroactivity approach to collateral attacks on sentences.”).  In fact, there is a presumption 
that at some level, AEDPA codified Teague. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 198 (“Congress 
used concepts and incorporated language from Teague in several specific attempts to restrict 
the scope of habeas review.”); Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 933 n.16 (collecting 
cases debating whether AEDPA codified Teague). But see Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 
44 (2011) (asserting that AEDPA did not codify Teague).  Still, the Greene Court recognized 
that while Teague and AEDPA are discrete, “neither abrogates or [sic] qualifies the other.” 
Id. 
 152. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). 
 153. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001); see also Ellen F. Carey, Closing the Door on 
Successive Habeas Petitions:  Supreme Court Must Expressly Hold That New Rule Is 
Retroactively Available for Collateral Review Under the AEDPA, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
273, 278–79 (2002). 
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Tyler is the chief case addressing the retroactivity of new rules to 
successive habeas petitions.  In Tyler, the Court was tasked with 
determining, under AEDPA, whether Cage v. Louisiana154 was entitled to 
retroactive effect on a successive collateral challenge.155  The 5-4 Court 
determined that the new rule had not been made retroactive by the Supreme 
Court because the Court had not expressly held Cage to be retroactive.156  
The Court interpreted the word “made” to mean “held” and established that 
the requirements for successive collateral challenges are only satisfied when 
the Court expressly holds a new rule to be retroactive.157  The Court further 
implied that even if Cage—or any new rule—superficially met one of the 
Teague exceptions, it still would not be made retroactive unless the Court 
expressly held so.158  Moreover, the Court held that a rule is not made 
retroactive if the Court establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the 
finding of retroactivity to the lower courts.159  Such a strict interpretation of 
the statute was necessary, the Court reasoned, “for the proper 
implementation of the collateral review structure created by AEDPA” 
because the thirty-day time limit for considering authorizations to file 
successive habeas motions implies that the lower courts were not intended 
 
 154. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (finding unconstitutional a jury instruction that 
could have been interpreted to allow for conviction without proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt). 
 155. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 658–59.  The inmate in Tyler filed a successive motion under 
§ 2254, which is the state analogue to § 2255. See supra note 80.  Accordingly, the Court in 
Tyler interpreted the “made retroactive by the Supreme Court” language as stated in 
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) and in the state context. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  
Nevertheless, the language in § 2244(b)(2)(A) also applies to federal prisoners seeking to file 
successive motions under § 2255 and is identical to the threshold language in § 2255(h)(2). 
See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.  Thus, the holding in Tyler also applies to the 
federal successive habeas context. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 n.430 (“Tyler 
involved an interpretation of § 2244, but its holding presumably would apply to § 2255, 
given the same statutory language.”). 
 156. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663–64. 
 157. See id.  The Court decided that “made” meant “held,” in part through reliance on an 
earlier Supreme Court case that invoked a strict reading of a different provision of AEDPA. 
See id. at 664 (“To be sure, the statute uses the word ‘made,’ not ‘held.’  But we have 
already stated, in a decision interpreting another provision of AEDPA, that Congress need 
not use the word ‘held’ to require as much.” (referring to Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
412 (2000) (holding the phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to holdings of the Supreme 
Court))).  Therefore, Tyler is not the only Supreme Court case to produce a conservative 
reading of AEDPA. See generally Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ:  Trapped in the 
Narrow Holdings of Supreme Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741 (2010) 
(criticizing the Williams holding). 
 158. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666 (“The most [the petitioner] can claim is that, based 
on . . . Teague, this Court should make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review.  What 
is clear, however, is that we have not ‘made’ Cage retroactive to cases on collateral 
review.”); Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 (“Even if a claim is not ‘Teague-barred’ by 
application of Teague itself, the claim may still be barred if it is raised in a second or 
successive § 2255 motion. . . .  [T]he Supreme Court itself has to declare the ‘new rule’ 
retroactive.”).  Notably, while the Court held that Cage had not been made retroactive, the 
Court suggested that Cage was not even retroactive under Teague. See Entzeroth, supra note 
5, at 214 (“Although the Court declined to state definitively whether Cage is retroactive or 
not, the majority certainly hinted that it was not.”). 
 159. See Tyler, 533 U.S at 663. 
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to employ “the difficult legal analysis” necessary to resolve questions of 
retroactivity.160  The Court did, however, remark that multiple holdings 
may be used to surmise the retroactivity of a new rule, but “only if the 
holdings in those cases necessarily dictate” that result.161 
In her Tyler concurrence, Justice O’Connor agreed with the majority that 
the clearest instance of when the Court has made a rule retroactive is when 
the Court has expressly held that the new rule is retroactive.162  Justice 
O’Connor emphasized, however, as did Justice Breyer writing for the four-
justice dissent, that two or more cases can logically dictate that a new rule 
has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court: 
[A] single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine 
qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision.  This Court instead 
may “ma[k]e” a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that 
logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule.  To apply the syllogistic 
relationship described by Justice Breyer, if we hold in Case One that a 
particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review 
and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it 
necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.  In such circumstances, we can be said to have “made” 
the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.163 
Justice O’Connor further explained that the Court can be said to have made 
a rule retroactive “only where the Court’s holdings logically permit no other 
conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.”164  Justice O’Connor also 
invoked Teague’s first exception to provide an “easy to demonstrate” 
example of the multiple holdings principle:  “When the Court holds as a 
new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private 
individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority 
to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has ‘made’ that new rule 
retroactive to cases on collateral review.”165  Since the Tyler decision, 
courts have come to follow Justice O’Connor’s approach in determining 
whether a rule is made retroactive.166 
 
 160. Id. at 664; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 161. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666. 
 162. Id. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 668–69 (citations omitted); see also id. at 672–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 165. Id.  When this occurs, Justice O’Connor explained, the Court has made the rule 
retroactive “through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of 
principles by lower courts.” Id.  Justice Breyer, for the dissent, agreed. See id. at 675 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 166. See Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Several courts of 
appeals have adopted Justice O’Connor’s Tyler analysis to determine whether a recent 
decision by the Supreme Court satisfies the standards for authorization under 
§ 2255(h)(2).”); Nishi Kumar, Cruel, Unusual, and Completely Backwards:  An Argument 
for Retroactive Application of the Eighth Amendment, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (2015) 
(“[A]lthough AEDPA seems to explicitly require that the Supreme Court make a rule 
retroactive . . . this requirement has not been consistently applied by the lower courts.  The 
more common practice is for lower courts to discern whether the Supreme Court would have 
found a decision to be retroactive and deny or grant a petition on that basis.”); Vladeck, 
supra note 37, at 4 (“[A]fter Tyler, lower courts have generally agreed that, if a new rule is 
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4.  Criticisms of Tyler 
The Tyler decision has been criticized on several grounds, including its 
effect on Congress’s intent in promulgating AEDPA and its highly 
preclusive effect on successive habeas petitions.167  AEDPA’s legislative 
history suggests that Congress indeed intended to make it harder for 
successive petitions to be reviewed, but query whether Congress intended 
the Tyler majority’s exacting interpretation of the statute.168  Also unclear is 
whether Congress intended the slight difference in the syntax of 
§ 2255(f)(3) and § 2255(h)(2) to have such a substantial impact on the way 
retroactivity is assessed for first as opposed to successive § 2255 
motions.169  Further complicating matters is the general understanding that, 
on some level, AEDPA was “intended to incorporate, in wholesale fashion, 
the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.”170  But under the Court’s prior 
retroactivity jurisprudence, successive petitions based on new rules of 
constitutional law were not nearly as burdensome a showing to make.171 
Even taking Tyler at face value, it is unclear when the Court has “held” a 
rule to be retroactive, and the Tyler majority’s holding and Justice 
 
unambiguously retroactive based upon prior Supreme Court precedents (say, for example, 
because it is clearly ‘substantive’ under Teague), then there need not be a subsequent 
Supreme Court decision in which the new rule is ‘made retroactive’; it was already ‘made 
retroactive’ by dint of the prior holdings that all ‘substantive’ new rules are retroactively 
enforceable.”). 
 167. See infra notes 169, 176, 178–79, 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 87, 90, 152–53; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-518, 
at 111 (1996) (“This title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of . . . habeas 
corpus . . . .  Successive petitions must be approved by a panel of the court of appeals and are 
limited to those petitions that . . . involve new constitutional rights that have been 
retroactively applied by the Supreme Court.”).  Congress was also concerned with 
preventing “successive bites at the apple,” that is, multiple habeas petitions by the same 
petitioner. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 14,734 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“[T]his bill 
provides habeas petitioners with one bite of the apple.  It assures that no one convicted of a 
capital crime will be barred from seeking habeas relief in Federal court . . . [and] it 
appropriately limits second and subsequent habeas appeals to narrow and appropriate 
circumstances.”); 137 Cong. Rec. 16,538 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (recognizing a 
problem when prisoners take “a 10th bite of the apple, even a 20th bite of the apple”). 
 169. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 772–73 (“Congress intended to ensure that 
petitioners would have at least one full, fair opportunity to raise each meritorious 
claim . . . .  [But] those who voted for the legislation surely did not anticipate or intend the 
severe ripple effects that the preclusive successive petition rules have had . . . .”); see also id. 
at 771 (arguing that Congress likely did not intend to constrict successive federal habeas 
corpus in a way that prejudices meritorious claims that can only be litigated on successive 
collateral review).  Indeed, AEDPA was hastily drafted after the Oklahoma City bombing 
and has not “been hailed as an epitome of sophisticated statutory drafting.” Angela Ellis, “Is 
Innocence Irrelevant” to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations?  Avoiding a Miscarriage of 
Justice in Federal Habeas Corpus, 56 VILL. L. REV. 129, 148 (2011); see Lindh v. Murphy, 
521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk 
purse of the art of statutory drafting.”).  It is therefore not unfathomable that the hasty 
creation of the act unintentionally led to the Tyler holding. 
 170. Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 981; see also supra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
 171. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 710–11 (“The substantive standard that this 
‘gatekeeping panel’ is to apply . . . is far more restrictive and unforgiving than its 
antecedent.”). 
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O’Connor’s multiple holdings approach are in tension.  On the one hand, 
the Court has stated that only the Court itself can make a rule retroactive 
under § 2244(b)(2)(A) through an express holding to that effect.172  On the 
other hand, the majority suggested, and both Justice O’Connor and the 
dissent agreed, that multiple holdings can logically dictate the Court has 
held a new rule retroactive.173  Finally, Justice O’Connor’s easy example—
that a rule is made retroactive when it is a type contemplated by Teague’s 
first exception—only further obfuscates the inquiry.174 
Although there is a dearth of scholarship on Tyler, the existing scholarly 
reactions to the decision are largely critical of its narrow interpretation of 
§ 2244(b)(2)(A).175  Some have argued that Tyler erodes the established 
retroactivity approach and renders Teague an obsolete doctrine in the 
successive habeas context.176  While the Court maintains that Teague is still 
its own standard under AEDPA,177 by creating an inquiry that requires both 
examining whether the Supreme Court has expressly held a new rule 
retroactive and performing a Teague retroactivity analysis, Tyler has 
reduced the significance of the Teague analysis.  The Tyler decision also 
arguably impedes the traditional notions of the purpose of habeas corpus178 
and unreasonably limits lower federal courts’ jurisdiction over habeas 
petitions.179  In addition, some argue that Tyler’s virtual elimination of the 
availability of successive habeas petitions is a violation of the Suspension 
Clause.180  Indeed, Tyler may result in situations where a petitioner is never 
able to bring a successive claim based on a new ruling that would otherwise 
be classified as retroactive under Teague, because for all practical purposes 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to expressly hold a new rule retroactive when 
announcing the rule.181  Finally, Tyler leads to inequitable results for 
 
 172. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663–64 (2001). 
 173. See id. at 666; id. at 668–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 672–73 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 174. See id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 175. See sources cited infra notes 176, 178, 181, 182. 
 176. See, e.g., Gehring, supra note 96, at 210 (“[T]he Court’s decision in Tyler effectively 
eliminates the two exceptions found in Teague v. Lane, which in turn makes . . . Teague 
obsolete.”). 
 177. See generally Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002). 
 178. Because the Tyler reading of § 2255(h)(2) “forecloses meritorious [habeas] claims,” 
Litman, supra note 29, at 52, it prevents habeas review for prisoners who have been 
“incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent 
will be convicted,” Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
see also supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1914–15 
(2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court has used textualism to narrow courts’ jurisdiction 
in a variety of ways, and stating that Tyler limited federal courts’ ability to entertain habeas 
petitions). 
 180. See Allen, supra note 103, at 127 n.114; Gehring, supra note 96, at 211; see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl. 2. 
 181. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“After today’s opinion . . . [w]e 
will be required to restate the obvious, case by case, even when we have explicitly said, but 
not ‘held,’ that a new rule is retroactive.”); see also Doherty, supra note 101, at 481 & n.196 
(suggesting that, after Tyler, to avoid the waste and delay in waiting for a new rule to be held 
retroactive, the Court should describe the retroactivity of a new rule when announced, but 
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similarly situated habeas petitioners.182  The current circuit split on Johnson 
retroactivity exemplifies this inequity. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON JOHNSON RETROACTIVITY 
Before Johnson, inmates petitioning for habeas relief founded on 
erroneous applications of the residual clause generally relied on a line of 
cases that began with Begay v. United States.183  The ruling in Johnson, 
however, has supplanted those cases as the basis for habeas relief from 
sentences imposed under the residual clause.184  Inmates sentenced under 
the residual clause now have a new, and certainly more salient, argument 
for relief—they were deprived of due process of law. 
The circuit split on whether the new rule announced in Johnson can be 
used in successive petitions under § 2255 and overcome the § 2255(h)(2) 
approval requirement185 serves as a major impediment to petitioners in 
certain jurisdictions.186  As of the writing of this Note, the First, Second, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have authorized successive 
habeas petitions and found that Johnson has been made retroactive by the 
Supreme Court under § 2255(h)(2) and Tyler.187  On the other hand, the 
 
also recognizing that such a scenario is unlikely); Strauss, supra note 112, at 1247 (“The 
Supreme Court’s Tyler decision simply forecloses the possibility that a second or successive 
§ 2255 motion will be entertained without a Supreme Court holding of retroactivity.”); 
Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1444 
n.260 (2005) (“[T]he Court would have no reason when establishing a new constitutional 
rule in a direct appeal to speak to the applicability of the new rule to collateral cases.”). 
 182. See Strauss, supra note 112, at 1247–48 (“[After Tyler] even the Teague bright-line 
definition of ‘similarly situated,’ meaning all litigants in the same procedural posture, does 
not operate evenly.”).  Still, maintaining some restrictions on successive habeas motions 
does secure finality interests. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“The statutory bar against second or successive motions is one of the most 
important AEDPA safeguards for finality of judgment. . . .  If second and successive motions 
are not ‘greatly restrict[ed],’ there will be no end to collateral attacks on convictions and 
sentences, and there will be no finality of judgment.” (alterations in original)). 
 183. 553 U.S. 137 (2008); see, e.g., Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 
2014) (applying Begay but denying relief for lack of cognizability); Sun Bear v. United 
States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 
2011) (applying Begay and Chambers v. United States retroactively); see also Runyon, supra 
note 36, at 448 (discussing the pre-Johnson Supreme Court cases that construed the residual 
clause). 
 184. See Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing Johnson 
as overruling Begay). 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 186. To be clear, the split is on whether Johnson has been “made retroactive” and not on 
whether Johnson is retroactive under Teague or whether it announced a new constitutional 
rule.  In fact, at least one circuit that has held that Johnson has not been made retroactive 
recognizes that Johnson is substantive and thus likely retroactive under Teague. See In re 
Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 989 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 187. See, e.g., Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139, 140 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam); 
Rivera v. United States, No. 13-4654 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2015); In re Watkins, No. 15-5038, 
2015 WL 9241176, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015); Price, 795 F.3d at 734–35; Woods v. 
United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Striet v. United States, No. 
15-72506 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015).  Moreover, the U.S. Department of Justice regularly 
concedes that Johnson is retroactive for both initial and successive § 2255 motions. See 
Letter, In re Jackson, No. 15-8098 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2015) (urging the court to reconsider 
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Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have denied authorizations on the 
ground that Johnson has not been made retroactive by the Supreme 
Court.188  Accordingly, Part II.A examines select decisions from several of 
the circuits that have held that Johnson has been made retroactive, and Part 
II.B examines select decisions from the circuits that have found that 
Johnson has not been made retroactive.189 
A.  The Majority View:  The Supreme Court Has Made 
Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review 
Although the Seventh, Sixth, First, and Eighth Circuits agree that 
Johnson has been made retroactive, they are not in complete agreement as 
to why.  Part II.A.1 details Seventh and Sixth Circuit opinions holding that 
Johnson has been made retroactive.  Part II.A.2 highlights First and Eighth 
Circuit opinions granting authorization to file successive § 2255 motions 
based primarily on the Government’s concession that Johnson has been 
made retroactive. 
1.  The Seventh and Sixth Circuits:  
Johnson Was Made Retroactive Under Tyler 
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to rule on 
whether Johnson can be applied retroactively to a successive § 2255 
motion.  In Price v. United States,190 Price was convicted in 2006 of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).191  Price 
had three prior convictions that qualified him for the ACCA’s sentencing 
enhancement,192 and the court sentenced him to twenty years and ten 
months imprisonment,193 a term exceeding the fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum sentence under the ACCA.194  Price’s sentence was affirmed on 
direct appeal and his subsequent § 2255 motion was denied.195 
After the Supreme Court decided Johnson, Price petitioned the Seventh 
Circuit to authorize the district court to entertain a successive § 2255 
 
its holding in In re Gieswein, and indicating that the Government believes that Johnson has 
been made retroactive); Litman, supra note 40, at 82. 
 188. See, e.g., In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Gieswein, 802 
F.3d 1143, 1148–49 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989.  As of this 
writing, only Williams holds that Johnson is not retroactive under Teague.  Although 
scholars believe Johnson is retroactive under Teague, they are not in agreement that it has 
been made retroactive. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 29, at 48–49 (arguing that Johnson is 
retroactive under Teague but conceding uncertainty on whether it has been made 
retroactive); Vladeck, supra note 37 (arguing the Court should make Johnson retroactive but 
not weighing in on whether it has already done so). 
 189. The cases this part discusses were selected because they were either the first cases in 
their circuits to encounter the issue or were the first to provide substantive analysis beyond 
that of a summary order granting or denying authorization. 
 190. 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 191. Id. at 732. 
 192. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 193. See Price, 795 F.3d at 732. 
 194. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
 195. See Price, 795 F.3d at 732. 
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motion196 on the basis that his prior sentence, invoked under the 
unconstitutional residual clause, was unlawful.197  In determining whether 
to authorize Price’s successive motion, the court first engaged in a Teague 
analysis and established that the Johnson rule was one of constitutional law 
because it “rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment” to the Constitution.198  The court next found that the 
rule was a new rule, because it was not dictated by prior precedent nor 
previously available to Price.199  The court then determined that Johnson 
was also a substantive rule, because in striking down the residual clause, the 
Court prohibited a “certain category of punishment for a class of defendants 
because of their status.”200  The court held that a prisoner sentenced under 
the residual clause thus bears substantial risk of receiving “a punishment 
that the law cannot impose upon him.”201 
In finally determining that Johnson was “made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court,”202 the court reasoned that the 
Supreme Court need not expressly hold Johnson retroactive.203  The court 
relied on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Tyler,204 which stated that the 
Court can make a rule retroactive “through multiple holdings that logically 
dictate the retroactivity of the new rule.”205  As such, and because Justice 
O’Connor in Tyler explained that when the Court creates a new rule 
protecting a particular class of primary conduct from the criminal 
lawmaking authority’s power to proscribe,206 the Price court recognized 
that “it necessarily follows that [the Supreme Court] has ‘made’” the new 
substantive Johnson rule retroactive.207  The Price court, in essence, used 
the Bousley and Summerlin expansions of Teague’s first exception208 to 
characterize Johnson as substantive and as one of the easy cases that Justice 
O’Connor has said the Court has necessarily made retroactive.  In sum, 
because of the substantive nature of the Johnson rule, the court reasoned 
that the Supreme Court had made Johnson retroactive.209 
 
 196. See id.; supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Price, 795 F.3d at 732. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 732–33. 
 200. Id. at 734 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990)).  Saffle derived this 
language from Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See supra Part I.D.2. 
 201. Price, 795 F.3d at 734 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).  
Summerlin, in turn, was quoting United States v. Davis, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)—via Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)—to invoke a traditional purpose of habeas corpus. 
See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text. See 
generally supra Part I.D.2. 
 202. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012); see Price, 795 F.3d at 734. 
 203. See Price, 795 F.3d at 734. 
 204. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
 205. Price, 795 F.3d at 733 (quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring)); 
see also supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Price, 795 F.3d at 733 (quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 207. Id. at 734 (quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 208. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 209. See Price, 795 F.3d at 734. 
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The Sixth Circuit, in In re Watkins,210 took a similar approach.  Like the 
other circuits to consider the issue, the court first asserted that Johnson 
announced a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable 
to the petitioner.211  The court then invoked Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Tyler and determined that the Johnson rule fell within the 
easy to demonstrate logical relationships that Justice O’Connor 
articulated.212  Accordingly, the court held that because Johnson disallows 
“the imposition of an increased sentence on those defendants whose status 
as armed career criminals is dependent on offenses that fall within the 
residual clause . . . ‘[t]here is no escaping the logical conclusion that the 
[Supreme] Court itself has made Johnson categorically retroactive to cases 
on collateral review.’”213 
2.  The First and Eighth Circuits:  
Accepting the Government’s Concession of Retroactivity 
Like the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit in Pakala v. United States214 
authorized a petitioner’s request to file a successive § 2255 motion based on 
Johnson.215  In Pakala, the Government conceded that the petitioner “ha[d] 
at least made a prima facie showing that Johnson ha[d] been made 
retroactive by the Supreme Court.”216  In light of this concession, the court 
authorized the motion, but noted that the Johnson retroactivity question has 
divided the circuit courts.217 
The Eighth Circuit has also authorized a petitioner’s request to file a 
successive § 2255 motion alleging Johnson error.218  In Woods v. United 
States,219 the court granted deference to the Government’s position that 
Johnson has been made retroactive:  “Here, the United States concedes that 
Johnson is retroactive, and it joins Woods’s motion.  Based on the 
[G]overnment’s concession, we conclude that Woods has made a prima 
facie showing” that Johnson has been made retroactive.220  In a subsequent 
case, however, the Eighth Circuit again granted authorization to a petitioner 
but qualified its position on Johnson retroactivity:  “The district court—
unencumbered by the ‘stringent time limit’ that applies to the court of 
appeals—should [consider] the views of the other circuit courts.”221  In 
 
 210. No. 15-5038, 2015 WL 9241176 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015). 
 211. See id. at *3. 
 212. See id. at *5; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Watkins, 2015 WL 9241176, at *6 (quoting Price, 795 F.3d at 734); supra notes 
105–09 and accompanying text. 
 214. 804 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 215. See id. at 140. 
 216. Id. at 139. 
 217. See id. at 139 n.1. 
 218. Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 219. 805 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Menteer v. United States, 806 F.3d 1156, 1156–57 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 664 (2001)).  While the First and Eighth Circuits 
accepted the Government’s concession that Johnson was made retroactive, it is unclear 
whether courts can in fact accept such a concession. See Litman, supra note 27.  If the 
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effect, the Eighth Circuit, although finding that on a prima facie level 
Johnson has been made retroactive, left open the possibility that on remand 
the district court might disagree. 
B.  The Minority View:  The Supreme Court Has Not Made 
Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review 
In contrast to the aforementioned circuits, the Eleventh and Tenth 
Circuits have held that Johnson has not been made retroactive, and the Fifth 
Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that Johnson is not retroactive under 
Teague.222  Part II.B.1 begins with the Eleventh Circuit’s viewpoint that no 
series of holdings dictate that Johnson has been made retroactive, and Part 
II.B.2 addresses the Tenth Circuit’s textualist reasoning that led to its 
determination that Johnson has not been made retroactive.  Finally, Part 
II.B.3 details the Fifth Circuit’s outlier opinion. 
1.  The Eleventh Circuit:  Johnson Has Not Been Made 
Retroactive Under Tyler 
In In re Rivero,223 the petitioner was found guilty of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).224  In 2015, 
following the ruling in Johnson, Rivero filed an application with the 
Eleventh Circuit seeking an order permitting the district court to entertain a 
successive motion under § 2255.225 
The court began by conceding that Johnson announced a new substantive 
constitutional rule, because it “narrow[ed] the scope of [§] 924(e) by 
interpreting its terms, specifically, the term violent felony.”226  The court 
recognized, however, that under Tyler only the Supreme Court can make a 
new rule retroactive and that when it does so, “it does so unequivocally, in 
 
gatekeeping requirements are jurisdictional, and some courts have held that they are, a court 
must decide for itself if the rule has been made retroactive. See id. 
 222. This is the minority view even among the circuit courts denying authorizations. See 
Litman, supra note 27. 
 223. 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015).  As of this writing, the Rivero court has sua sponte 
appointed counsel for the petitioner and ordered briefing on the Johnson retroactivity 
question. See Order at 1–2, In re Rivero, No. 15-13089 (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015).  This 
section, however, only considers the opinion denying authorization for failing to make a 
prima facie showing that Johnson has been made retroactive.  Because the dissenting opinion 
provides exceptional insight into the argument that Johnson has been made retroactive, this 
section discusses the dissent’s counter arguments to the majority’s points in corresponding 
footnotes. 
 224. See United States v. Rivero, 141 F. App’x 800, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 
curiam). 
 225. See Rivero, 797 F.3d at 988.  Notably, Rivero’s original sentence was based on the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender residual clause—which uses identical 
language as the ACCA’s residual clause—and not the ACCA. See id. at 988.  Although this 
might be viewed as a distinction from the other Johnson-based petitions, the Eleventh Circuit 
has subsequently denied a Johnson claim from a prisoner sentenced under the ACCA, 
solidifying its view that Johnson has not been made retroactive. See In re Franks, No. 15-
15456-G, 2016 WL 80551, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016). 
 226. Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989 (alterations in original) (quoting Bryant v. Warden, FCC 
Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1278 (11th Cir. 2013)). 
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the form of a holding.”227  Although the court recognized, like the Price 
court, that a rule could be made retroactive through multiple holdings that 
logically dictate the rule’s retroactivity,228 the court nevertheless found that 
no combination of holdings necessarily dictated that Johnson was made 
retroactive.229 
The court also suggested that there are only “two types of new 
substantive rules of constitutional law” that the Supreme Court has 
“necessarily dictated” apply retroactively on collateral review:  new rules 
that prohibit the punishment of certain primary conduct, which place 
specific conduct or persons covered by a statute beyond the state’s power to 
punish,230 and new rules that prohibit “a category of punishment for certain 
offenders or offenses.”231  The court subsequently reasoned that the 
Johnson rule neither prohibits Congress from punishing a criminal who has 
a prior conviction for attempted burglary nor prohibits Congress from 
increasing that criminal’s sentence because of his prior conviction.232  In 
short, the Rivero court did not find that Johnson prevents a defendant from 
facing a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.233 
The majority responded to the dissent’s argument—that Bousley logically 
dictates that Johnson was made retroactive—by asserting that in Bousley 
the Court did not apply a new constitutional rule; rather, it applied a new 
rule that narrowed the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its 
 
 227. Id. (quoting In re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 228. See id.; see also In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 
(recognizing that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit followed a similar path [as Price] in Rivero”). 
 229. See Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989.  The Rivero court also explicitly referenced Price:  “We 
acknowledge that one of our sister circuits has held that Johnson applies retroactively . . . but 
we are unpersuaded by that decision.” Id. at 990. 
 230. See id. (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004)). 
 231. Id.  The Rivero court listed, as an example of this type of rule, the rule from Atkins v. 
Virginia. See id.  The Rivero court presumably derived the “category of punishment” 
language from Penry. See supra Part I.D.2.  The majority further asserted that the retroactive 
application of new substantive rules to cases on collateral review is “limit[ed] . . . to those 
rules that ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that 
the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon 
him.’” Rivero, 797 F.3d at 988 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352).  Judge Pryor in dissent 
argued that the majority eschewed Bousley, which held that decisions that narrow the scope 
of a statute by interpreting its terms are examples of precisely such a substantive rule. See id. 
at 996 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 232. See Rivero, 797 F.3d at 990.  The court stated that if Congress wished to impose 
lengthier sentences based on prior convictions, like those of Rivero, it could do so under a 
clear statute. See id. at 989.  The dissent responded by asserting that “[r]eliance upon what 
Congress could do to salvage what the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional is 
without legal foundation.” See id. at 999 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 233. See id. at 991 (majority opinion).  The dissent counter argued that Johnson has been 
made retroactive because the rule it established both narrows the scope of a criminal statute 
and places conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s authority to punish. 
See id. at 997 (Pryor, J., dissenting).  The dissent specifically relied on the multiple holdings 
approach outlined in Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence, arguing that in Bousley the 
Court held that rules limiting the reach of a federal criminal statute are not barred by Teague 
nonretroactivity and that Johnson is the same type of case as Bousley because it too 
narrowed the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms. See id. at 997–98.  She 
thus concluded that Bousley and Johnson taken together necessarily dictate Johnson’s 
retroactivity. See id. at 998. 
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terms.234  It reasoned that, per Summerlin, examples of new substantive 
rules include “‘decisions that narrow that scope of [a statute’s] terms’ and 
‘constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons 
covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.’”235  Therefore, 
the court held, the Bousley holding cannot necessarily dictate that Johnson 
(which announced a new constitutional rule) was made retroactive because 
Bousley did not rely on a new rule of constitutional law,236 and 
§ 2255(h)(2) allows successive motions based only on new rules of 
constitutional law.237  The majority also asserted that the dissent’s approach 
was markedly different from the Seventh Circuit’s approach, as Price 
surmised Johnson’s retroactivity because the rule prohibited a certain 
category of punishment for a class of defendants and not specifically that 
Bousley dictated Johnson’s retroactivity.238 
2.  The Tenth Circuit:  The Supreme Court Has Not Made Johnson 
Retroactive Because It Has Yet to Expressly Hold It Retroactive 
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Gieswein,239 
declined to hold that Johnson was made retroactive by the Supreme 
Court.240  The Gieswein court, however, employed a different approach 
than that of the Rivero court.241  Instead of initially surveying retroactivity 
case law and determining that no series of holdings logically dictates that 
Johnson has been made retroactive, the Gieswein court relied chiefly on the 
Tyler majority’s overarching principle—that “the Supreme Court is the only 
 
 234. See id. at 992 (majority opinion). 
 235. See id. at 991 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351–52).  The court implied both 
criteria must be met for a rule to be substantive. See id. at 991. But see id. at 997 (Pryor, J., 
dissenting) (“Summerlin could not be clearer that a rule is retroactive if it falls into one of the 
two related categories the Supreme Court described.  So requiring a new rule to check the 
boxes of both types of substantive, retroactive decisions—when the two types are listed 
disjunctively—is directly contrary to Summerlin.”). 
 236. See id. at 992 (majority opinion). 
 237. The dissent responded that Johnson is “precisely the kind of rule” the Court has held 
applies retroactively, as it “‘necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant’ . . . faces 
a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Id. at 998 (Pryor, J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352).  The dissent noted that 
Summerlin does not require the new rule to both narrow the scope of a statute and place 
conduct beyond the state’s power to punish—rather these are distinct ways a rule can be 
substantive and retroactive. See id. at 997–98.  The dissent continued that although Bousley 
did not announce a new constitutional rule, it is not precluded from dictating Johnson’s 
retroactivity. See id. at 998 n.7.  The dissent asserted that retroactivity is logically dictated 
when the Supreme Court holds in one case that a particular type of rule applies retroactively 
and in a subsequent case that a given rule is of that type. See id.  Tyler, the dissent argued, 
does not require that Case One hold that a particular type of constitutional rule applies 
retroactively because “[t]hat would conflate the elements of a successive motion that the 
Tyler majority made clear were distinct.” Id. 
 238. See id. at 992 (majority opinion).  Conversely, the dissent asserted that “[t]o the 
extent there is any discrepancy [between the Rivero dissent and Price], it is only a matter of 
emphasis.” Id. at 999 n.8 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 239. 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 240. See id. at 1148–49. 
 241. See id. at 1148. 
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entity that can ‘make’ a new rule retroactive” and only through a “holding 
to that effect.”242  The court reasoned that its “inquiry is statutorily limited 
to whether the Supreme Court has made the new rule retroactive to cases on 
collateral review.”243  The court found it could not apply Johnson 
retroactively simply because the Supreme Court has not held that the new 
rule in Johnson is retroactive.244  Although the Gieswein court then 
acknowledged the multiple holdings approach, the court rejected the 
petitioner’s argument that the Supreme Court had made the rule in Johnson 
retroactive because it found that no series of holdings necessarily dictate 
that Johnson was made retroactive.245  The court reiterated that it cannot 
“do more than simply rely on Supreme Court holdings on retroactivity.”246  
Without a holding on Johnson retroactivity specifically, the court declined 
to grant the petitioner authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.247 
3.  The Fifth Circuit:  Johnson Is Not Substantive 
and Therefore Not Retroactive 
Like the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit, in In re 
Williams,248 declined to grant a petitioner’s request to file a successive 
§ 2255 motion.249  Unlike its sister circuits, however, the Fifth Circuit did 
not analyze the petitioner’s claim under Tyler, but rather suggested that 
Johnson was not retroactive under Teague.250  The court began by stating 
that Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law.251  But the court 
then asserted that Johnson does not fall within Teague’s watershed rule 
exception nor is it substantive.252  The court concluded that Johnson does 
not forbid a certain category of punishment because, after Johnson, 
 
 242. See id. at 1146 (quoting Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id. at 1147.  Ergo, the court asserted, “[T]he mere fact a new rule might fall 
within the general parameters of overarching retroactivity principles established by the 
Supreme Court (i.e., Teague) is not sufficient.” Id. at 1146. 
 245. Id. at 1147.  Although they reached different conclusions, both the Price and Rivero 
courts emphasized the multiple holdings approach and examined whether certain holdings 
dictated that Johnson was made retroactive.  In sidestepping the multiple holdings method, 
the Gieswein court emphasized “the difficult legal analysis that can be required to determine 
questions of retroactivity in the first instance” and opted to adhere to Tyler and a plain 
reading of AEDPA. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1148. 
 247. See id. at 1149.  The court also declined “to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach in 
Price” because Price “did what we have said we cannot do:  it made its ‘own determination 
that a new rule fits within [a] Teague exception [to nonretroactivity].’” Id. at 1148 
(alterations in original) (quoting Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994). 
 248. 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 249. See id. at 326. 
 250. See id. at 325–26.  Indeed, after Williams, a petitioner’s first § 2255 motion alleging 
Johnson error was denied. See Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-CV-00152 (N.D. Tex. 
Nov. 19, 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-7426 (Dec. 11, 2015).  These cases, however, 
represent the ultra minority view. See Litman, supra note 27. 
 251. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 325 (“Joining the four other circuits that have decided this 
issue, we hold that Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law.”). 
 252. See id. at 325–26. 
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individuals may still be sentenced to fifteen years in prison for possession 
of a firearm, albeit not under a vague statute.253 
The court then discussed Bousley, but instead of examining it in the 
context of the Teague exceptions, it proceeded to rebut the Rivero dissent’s 
argument that Bousley logically dictates Johnson retroactivity.254  The court 
asserted that Bousley does not control the Johnson retroactivity inquiry 
because the rule announced in Bousley emerged from the Court’s 
interpretation of a statute—which is substantive and not subject to 
Teague—while Johnson resulted in the complete invalidation of a statute—
which the Williams court likened to a new procedural rule.255 
In sum, with the exception of the Williams decision, the cases discussed 
in this part reveal that the courts of appeals are largely in agreement that 
Johnson announced a new substantive constitutional rule that is retroactive 
under Teague and should be applied to initial collateral challenges.  They 
are split, though, over whether Johnson has been made retroactive by the 
Supreme Court so as to permit its utilization on successive collateral 
challenges.  With the circuit split explored, this Note next puts forth a 
solution to the split and to the overall approach to retroactivity for 
successive collateral challenges. 
III.  A PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
AND THE TYLER APPROACH 
With the current circuit split resulting in the disparate treatment of 
similarly situated prisoners, a Supreme Court decision on Johnson 
retroactivity—which will hopefully materialize in Welch v. United States256 
this Term—would bring welcome clarification to the circuits’ conflicting 
viewpoints.  But while a Supreme Court holding adopting the majority view 
and stating that Johnson is retroactive under Teague would reconcile the 
circuit split,257 this part proposes that the Supreme Court explicitly hold that 
Johnson has been made retroactive.  By finding that Johnson has been 
made retroactive under Justice O’Connor’s multiple holdings principle—
specifically that Bousley dictates that Johnson was made retroactive258—the 
Court would still allow for those prisoners sentenced above the statutory 
maximum under the unconstitutional residual clause to seek relief 
uniformly. 
Indeed, while such a holding would facilitate relief for those with 
meritorious Johnson claims otherwise foreclosed by an overly strict 
interpretation of Tyler and § 2255(h)(2), it would also be an important first 
 
 253. See id.  The Rivero court also made this assertion, see In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 
990–91 (11th Cir. 2015), although unlike Williams, it found Johnson to be substantive, see 
id. at 989. 
 254. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 326.  In fact, the Williams court never explicitly mentioned 
Tyler. 
 255. See id. 
 256. 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari). 
 257. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 258. Cf. supra notes 233, 237 (describing the Rivero dissent’s argument that Bousley 
logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive). See generally supra Part I.D.2. 
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step in recalibrating the overall approach to assessing retroactivity for 
successive habeas petitions.  If the Court were to then take an additional 
step and find that Johnson falls within the easy example articulated by 
Justice O’Connor in her Tyler concurrence, the Court would effectively 
reframe its whole approach to retroactivity for successive habeas petitions 
and abrogate the problem-ridden Tyler majority method.259 
By emphasizing Justice O’Connor’s easy example of when a rule has 
logically been made retroactive as the standard by which a court determines 
whether a rule is made retroactive under AEDPA, the Court would establish 
that when it announces a new substantive rule in accordance with the 
Teague doctrine—like the rule in Johnson—the Court has simultaneously 
made the rule retroactive.  Such an approach would effectively cause the 
Tyler majority’s method to collapse back into its Teague origins, rendering 
Teague once again the primary, and only, inquiry for assessing retroactivity 
for successive collateral challenges.260  In effect, this would place the 
“made retroactive” determination in the hands of the lower courts and allow 
them to assess retroactivity in accordance with Teague principles and 
without waiting for a Supreme Court holding specifically addressing the 
new rule’s retroactivity.261  Ultimately, this approach would liberalize a 
portion of the overly restrictive successive petition statutes and allow for 
easier successive collateral review of meritorious claims based on new 
constitutional rules.262 
By demonstrating that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson is 
substantive and retroactive, Part III.A posits that the Supreme Court has 
made Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review.  In doing so, Part 
III.A also rebuts the arguments made by the courts that have held that 
Johnson has not been made retroactive.263  Part III.B then explains the 
additional step the Supreme Court should consider taking in finding that 
Johnson was made retroactive, a step that entails a liberal reading of Justice 
O’Connor’s easy example of when a new rule is made retroactive.  Part 
III.B also explains how finding that Johnson was made retroactive under 
the easy example would recast the Supreme Court’s retroactivity approach 
for successive habeas petitions.  Finally, Part III.C examines the policy 
benefits that would result were the Court to hold that Johnson has been 
made retroactive. 
 
 259. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 660 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra note 
165 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 112, 151, 176 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part 
I.D.2. 
 261. Cf. supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Litman, supra note 29, at 52 (noting the current approach prematurely forecloses 
upon otherwise meritorious claims). 
 263. See supra Part I.B. 
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A.  The Multiple Holdings Approach 
As a preliminary matter, Johnson is retroactive under general 
retroactivity doctrine as established by Teague and its progeny.264  First, 
Johnson announced a new rule, as it was not dictated by prior precedent nor 
was it previously available.265  The Johnson rule is also one of 
constitutional law, because it stems from the Court’s determination that the 
residual clause violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.266  
Furthermore, the Johnson rule is exempt from nonretroactivity because it is 
substantive per Teague’s first exception.267  As exemplified by Bousley and 
restated in Summerlin, Johnson narrows the scope of a criminal statute—on 
constitutional grounds—by interpreting its terms, which is necessarily a 
substantive rule because failure to apply it carries a significant risk that a 
defendant will face “a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”268 
But has Johnson been made retroactive?  While the Court in Tyler 
established that the word “made” is equivalent to “held,”269 the majority 
stated—and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and the dissent emphasized—
that a new rule can be been made retroactive through a series of holdings 
that logically dictate that result.270  This is precisely the situation at bar.  In 
Bousley, the Court held that rules limiting the scope of a criminal statute by 
narrowing its terms are retroactive.271  In Johnson, the Court narrowed the 
 
 264. See Litman, supra note 27; supra note 187 and accompanying text. See generally 
supra Parts I.D.2, II. 
 265. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).  Indeed, this point is 
seemingly uncontested. See supra text accompanying notes 199, 211, 226, 251. 
 266. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 198, 211, 226, 251. 
 267. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47; Litman, supra note 27; supra Parts I.D.1, II. 
 268. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004); see also supra Part I.D.2; cf. 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758, at *13 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) 
(holding the rule in Miller retroactive because as a substantive rule, it “set forth categorical 
constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond 
the State’s power to impose. . . .  [W]hen a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred by 
the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful”).  The 
Rivero and Williams courts suggest that the Johnson rule does not mitigate the risk that a 
defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose because if Congress so chooses, it 
can still mandate a sentence of fifteen years—via a clear statute—upon someone convicted 
of possession of a firearm with three prior violent felony convictions. See In re Rivero, 797 
F.3d 986, 990 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2015).  But 
what Congress could do through tighter language would not cure prior injustices, and neither 
court produced authority for this proposition. See In re Watkins, No. 15-5038, 2015 WL 
9241176, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015).  Such rationale also overlooks the Court’s Bousley 
decision, where Congress too could have enacted a statute that criminalized mere possession 
of a weapon during the course of a felony, but such speculation had no bearing on whether 
Bailey was retroactive. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619–21 (1998); supra 
Part I.D.2; cf. Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *13 (“The fact that life without parole 
could be a proportionate sentence for . . . [some] juvenile offender[s] does not mean that all 
other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the 
deprivation of a substantive right.”). 
 269. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001). 
 270. See id. at 666; id. at 668–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra Part I.D.3. 
 271. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. 
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scope of a criminal statute.272  Simply stated, under the multiple holdings 
framework273 recognized by the Tyler majority, emphasized by the Tyler 
dissent, and endorsed by Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence, the Court 
has made Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review.274 
B.  Justice O’Connor’s Easy Example 
In deciding whether Johnson was made retroactive, the Supreme Court 
might also consider recasting the entire Tyler approach to § 2255(h)(2).  It 
could do so by invoking in its analysis the doctrinal underpinnings of 
habeas corpus275 in conjunction with Justice O’Connor’s easy example of 
when a rule has logically been made retroactive.276  Crucially, the language 
 
 272. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); Litman, supra note 29, 
at 47.  The Williams court argued that the distinction between a decision narrowing the terms 
of a statute and complete invalidation of a statute is enough to break any chain of logic 
between Bousley and Johnson. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 326.  But this is merely a 
distinction without a difference. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47 (“It is hard to see how a 
decision ‘interpreting’ ACCA’s scope would be substantive, but a decision invalidating 
ACCA’s residual clause—which also alters ACCA’s scope—would not be.  
Both . . . decisions modify the elements of an offense and alter a defendant’s eligibility for a 
15-year term of imprisonment.”). 
 273. While this section emphasizes that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson was made 
retroactive, it is also feasible that the Court’s recent Montgomery decision, see supra notes 
143–47 and accompanying text, which states that Teague and the Constitution require the 
retroactive application of substantive rules, also dictates that the Court has made the 
substantive Johnson rule retroactive, see Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *6, *7. 
 274. Cf. supra notes 233, 237 (describing the Rivero dissent’s argument that Bousley 
logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive).  The Rivero and Williams courts’ 
rejection of this approach is flawed because both courts declined to analyze the Bousley rule 
as articulated in Summerlin and to recognize that rules that narrow the scope of a criminal 
statute operate retroactively because failure to apply them carries the risk that a defendant 
would face a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 
542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004); see also supra Parts I.D.2, II.  Furthermore, the Rivero court’s 
argument that Bousley cannot logically dictate Johnson’s retroactivity, because Bousley did 
not announce a new rule of constitutional law, is also misplaced. See In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 
986, 992 (11th Cir. 2015).  The court understood Summerlin to require that a decision 
interpreting a statute also announce a constitutional rule and therefore concluded that 
because the Bousley rule is not constitutional, it cannot dictate the retroactivity of the 
constitutional Johnson rule. See id.  But the Summerlin Court did not hold as such, and the 
Tyler court did not suggest that the multiple holdings approach requires all holdings involved 
to be constitutional in nature. See generally Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348; Tyler, 533 U.S. 656; 
supra note 237.  The Gieswein court’s conservative approach—framed by plain meaning 
statutory interpretation and a close reading of Tyler—also falls short. See In re Gieswein, 
802 F.3d 1143, 1146–49 (10th Cir. 2015).  While logical, it disregards the multiple holdings 
method that all of the justices in Tyler endorsed to varying degrees of warmth. See supra 
Part I.D.3.  Finally, the Williams court’s analysis is flawed because Johnson is not a 
procedural rule that is barred from retroactive application under Teague—it falls precisely 
within the Bousley and Summerlin definitions of substantive rules. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 
325–26; supra Part I.D.2; cf. Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *14 (stating that the 
argument that Miller announced a procedural rule “conflates a procedural requirement 
necessary to implement a substantive guarantee with a rule that ‘regulate[s] only the manner 
of determining the defendant’s culpability’” (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353 (alteration 
in original))). 
 275. See supra notes 77, 134, 201 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra note 165 and 
accompanying text. 
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Justice O’Connor used in her easy example is identical to the language used 
by the Court in Teague to describe the first exception,277 which entitles 
certain rules to retroactive effect because they “assure that no man has been 
incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk 
that the innocent will be convicted.”278  The first exception has since 
evolved into the substantive rule exception.279  The Court applies 
substantive rules retroactively because failure to do so would denature the 
core purposes of habeas corpus.280 
Indeed, in Teague and its progeny, the Court has routinely invoked the 
common theme of habeas corpus’s purpose when determining the 
retroactivity of new rules.281  Accordingly, if one reads Justice O’Connor’s 
easy example to stand for the proposition that rules falling within Teague’s 
first exception have necessarily been made retroactive,282 and one 
simultaneously grafts the Court’s analogy in Bousley upon Justice 
O’Connor’s reasoning,283 what survives is the notion that substantive 
rules—like those that limit the reach of statutes and the application of 
which serve the core functions of habeas corpus284—have also necessarily 
been made retroactive.  Applying this method to the instant situation, the 
substantive rule announced in Johnson is entitled to retroactive effect on 
successive collateral challenges because failure to do so would impede 
habeas corpus’s remedial purpose.285  In short, if the Court were to establish 
that Johnson has been made retroactive under Justice O’Connor’s easy 
example, it would set a precedent dictating that new substantive rules have 
necessarily been made retroactive.286 
 
 277. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669. 
 278. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 
244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 279. See supra notes 129–47 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 130–36, 141, 142 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 130–36, 141, 142 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 165, 174 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 130–36, 141, 142 and accompanying text. 
 285. Johnson invalidated a criminal statute on constitutional grounds, thus limiting the 
ability of the government to punish certain career offenders erroneously as violent felons and 
impose fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences on these individuals. See Litman, supra 
note 29, at 47.  This type of error, i.e., sentencing above the statutory maximum and under an 
unconstitutional statute, is precisely the type of error that habeas is designed to protect 
against. See supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text.  The Price and Watkins courts 
employed similar reasoning, concluding that the new rule in Johnson fell squarely within the 
first Teague exception and was thus made retroactive. See supra Part II.A.1.  The Rivero 
dissent also proffered this same argument in describing Johnson as having been made 
retroactive. See supra Part II.B.1.  Although these courts relied on Justice O’Connor’s easy 
to demonstrate example as a basis for the deduction that Johnson has been made retroactive, 
no court called specifically for an expansion of the easy example, and both courts invoked 
iterations of Penry language in their reasoning. See supra Part II.  This Note adheres to a 
broader view of Teague—that substantive rules operate retroactively. 
 286. The Supreme Court’s recent Montgomery decision further supports expanding 
Justice O’Connor’s easy example to mean that substantive rules have necessarily been made 
retroactive. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758, at *6, *7 (U.S. 
Jan. 25, 2016).  Indeed, if, as the Court articulated in Montgomery, the Constitution requires 
the retroactive application of substantive rules in state collateral review courts because it is 
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The additional functional result of this approach would be that Teague 
would once against govern the inquiry for assessing the retroactivity of new 
rules for successive collateral challenges.  This is so because a court would 
need only to determine whether a new rule is substantive under Teague in 
deciding whether it qualifies for retroactive effect on successive 
challenges.287  In fact, this result is consistent with the Court’s own 
retroactivity practice.  From a pragmatic perspective, it would be 
counterintuitive for the Court to hold that a substantive rule has not been 
made retroactive unless the rule was not retroactive under Teague to begin 
with.  Consider Tyler:  while there the Court found that Cage was not made 
retroactive and declined to address the question of whether the rule was 
retroactive generally under Teague, it appears that the Court would not have 
found Cage retroactive under Teague if presented with the question.288  
Perhaps the Court was manifesting the view that if a rule falls within the 
Teague exceptions, the Court has made it retroactive, while if a rule does 
not fall within the Teague exceptions, the Court has not made it 
retroactive.289 
C.  The Policy Implications of Finding 
That Johnson Was Made Retroactive 
Finding that Johnson has been made retroactive under the multiple 
holdings approach will immediately benefit those with viable Johnson 
claims.  But finding further that Johnson falls within Justice O’Connor’s 
easy example—which the Court can do this Term in Welch—will set a 
precedent ensuring that future meritorious claims founded on new 
constitutional rules can be afforded due consideration on successive 
collateral review without being barred by an overly restrictive interpretation 
of § 2255(h)(2).290 
 
unconstitutional to detain individuals for conduct that is beyond the law making authority to 
proscribe, it necessarily follows that substantive rules must be given retroactive effect in 
federal collateral review courts, regardless of whether a petition is initial or successive. See 
Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *7 (“[T]he Constitution requires substantive rules to have 
retroactive effect regardless of when a conviction became final.”).  Thus, by considering new 
substantive rules to be made retroactive, a result the Court could effect by liberally 
interpreting Justice O’Connor’s easy example of the multiple holdings principle, the Court 
would avoid constitutional issues that might otherwise occur if substantive claims on 
successive § 2255 motions are denied under the current regime. 
 287. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the development of the substantive rule exception). 
 288. See supra note 158. 
 289. Although perhaps post hoc ergo propter hoc logic, this proposition finds support in 
the fact that on another occasion, the Court declined to decide whether a prior rule was made 
retroactive. See In re Smith, 526 U.S. 1157 (1999) (denying a petition for an original writ of 
habeas corpus).  Professor Stephen Vladeck suggests that the Court denied the writ and the 
opportunity to decide whether the rule at issue had been made retroactive “perhaps because, 
so soon after AEDPA, it hoped that cases presenting such circumstances would be rare (and 
perhaps because the ‘new rule’ at issue turned out to not be retroactive).” See Vladeck, supra 
note 37, at 8. 
 290. See supra Part I.D.4 (discussing the drawbacks of the strict Tyler interpretation of 
the successive collateral challenge bar). 
2016] REFRAMING RETROACTIVITY UNDER JOHNSON 1649 
Accordingly, the Court should adopt Justice O’Connor’s easy example as 
the test for surmounting the retroactivity requirements of § 2255(h)(2),291 to 
both reduce disparity among similarly situated individuals and to protect the 
core purposes of habeas corpus review292 and § 2255(h)(2).293  Adopting 
this approach would limit the impact of the Tyler decision and soften the 
strict statutory reading given to § 2255(h)(2).294  It would also reinvigorate 
the Teague analysis in the successive habeas context.295  Additionally, such 
a method would not result in an unreasonable interpretation of § 2255(h)(2) 
because the Court already interprets § 2255(f)(3)’s “made retroactive” 
language to mean retroactive in accordance with Teague.296  Finally, this 
approach would solve the inefficiency problem of waiting for a Supreme 
Court holding on the retroactivity of a new rule, which on a practical level 
is neither an expedient nor guaranteed event.297 
Proponents of the status quo—those that might maintain a rigid bar on 
successive habeas petitions—might not agree that Johnson has been made 
retroactive under Tyler and would certainly not call for a broader reading of 
Tyler and § 2255(h)(2).  Still, while these proponents may cite finality 
interests, this Note’s approach does not significantly undermine such 
interests; finality concerns are lessened in the sentencing context.298  
 
 291. Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence is already frequently looked to in 
assessing retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. See supra note 166 and 
accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text; see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 
656, 676–77 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that AEDPA’s purpose is to prevent 
successive petitions when lower courts determine the existence of new rules and their 
retroactive applicability).  Justice Breyer thus asserts that the legislation was not intended to 
bar the lower courts from applying Teague principles to determine the retroactivity of new 
rules announced by the Supreme Court. See id. 
 294. See supra Part I.D.3–4. 
 295. Using Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence to collapse Tyler into its Teague 
foundations seems appropriate, as Justice O’Connor also authored the Teague plurality. See 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text 
(discussing the argument that the Tyler majority approach abrogates Teague). 
 296. See supra notes 150, 151 and accompanying text.  While the Court in Tyler looked 
to § 2254(d) in determining that “made” meant “held,” see supra note 157 and 
accompanying text, abandoning that approach would bring the Court’s approach to 
§ 2255(h)(2) in better accord with its approach to § 2255(f)(3), see supra notes 150–51 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s approach to retroactivity for initial § 2255 
motions).  This is not unreasonable, as the language of § 2255(h)(2) is more similar to the 
language of § 2255(f)(3) than it is to § 2254(d)(1). See supra notes 87, 90, 157 and 
accompanying text. See generally supra Part I.D.  The Court could justify this approach by 
relying on its power to equitably construe habeas statutes—the Court has previously 
equitably construed habeas statutes to afford relief that would otherwise be denied had the 
statute been given a strict textualist reading. See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 
483–84 (2000); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998); see also Stevenson, 
supra note 44, at 776 (“[T]he Court has shown a willingness to construe some AEDPA 
provisions narrowly so as to preserve the vitality of the writ.”). 
 297. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra note 117; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL 
280758, at *11 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (“[T]he retroactive application of substantive rules does 
not implicate a State’s weighty interests in . . . finality of convictions and 
sentences. . . .  This concern [of wasting resources] has no application in the realm of 
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Furthermore, should the Court choose to adopt this approach, there would 
be little to no floodgate risk.299  The number of petitioners with Johnson 
claims is relatively few,300 and petitioners who will inevitably seek to rely 
on other new rules as the basis of successive claims301 will still face several 
gatekeeping provisions and substantial procedural hurdles.302  Finally, 
while expecting the circuit courts to use the Teague analysis to determine 
whether a new rule has been made retroactive may appear unrealistic in 
light of the thirty-day time limit they are afforded to review such petitions, 
the inquiry has always been a prima facie one.303  Determining whether a 
rule is prima facie substantive under Teague within thirty days is not overly 
burdensome and is thus not an unreasonable expectation.304 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit split on Johnson retroactivity for successive collateral 
challenges is currently resulting in the disparate treatment of similarly 
situated individuals.  As explained herein, the Johnson rule—which is 
substantive because it invalidates a sentencing statute on constitutional 
grounds—should be given retroactive effect in all instances so as to 
preserve the core functions of habeas review.  Through Welch, the Supreme 
Court will hopefully resolve the split so that prisoners wrongly sentenced 
above the statutory maximum for their offenses can uniformly seek relief. 
But while the Supreme Court could resolve the split by holding that 
Johnson is retroactive under Teague, it should also consider clarifying the 
problematic Tyler majority reading of § 2255(h)(2) by finding further that 
Johnson has been made retroactive as described by Justice O’Connor in her 
Tyler concurrence.  Such a holding would reframe the approach of 
retroactivity to successive habeas petitions, resulting in the notion that rules 
encompassed by Teague’s first exception, and the application of which 
serve the core underpinnings of habeas corpus, have necessarily been made 
retroactive.  This approach would soften Tyler’s control and allow lower 
courts to apply Teague in determining the retroactivity of new rules to 
successive motions without waiting for a Supreme Court ruling on the 
issue.  In conclusion, the method this Note proposes would reduce the 
inequitable administration of the law, put an end to a part of the overly 
restrictive AEDPA, and give those with otherwise meritorious successive 
 
substantive rules, for no resources marshaled by a State could preserve a conviction or 
sentence that the Constitution deprives the State of power to impose.” (citing Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and 
dissenting in part))). 
 299. See supra note 117 (discussing floodgate risks). 
 300. See Russell, supra note 79, at 135; supra note 25. 
 301. These include both state and federal inmates, as the “made retroactive by the 
Supreme Court” language applies to both state and federal inmates seeking to file successive 
habeas motions.  See supra Part I.C. 
 302. See supra Part I.C. 
 303. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 304. See In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 432–33 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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claims a chance at liberty—liberty to which they are equitably and legally 
entitled. 
